Provably Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols

Authenticated Key Exchange(AKE)is one of the core tools of network security communication.It can establish a session key in a publicly insecure network,and then use the established session key in subsequent protocols to protect communication data from eavesdropping or malicious modification.The traditional authentication key exchange(AKE)protocol is based on a strong security assumption,without considering that the attacker can obtain the internal confidential information of the participants(such as private keys,temporary random numbers).However,in reality,an attacker can detect and analyze changes in the physical information of the cryptosystem(such as electromagnetic effects,power loss,cold boot attack)through side-channel attacks to obtain the internal secret information of the participants,resulting in many The secure AKE scheme is no longer safe in the face of these attacks.IN order to fundamentally resist side channel attacks,the researchers proposed the concept of Leakage-Resilient AKE and designed Leakage-Resilient AKE protocols(LR AKE),but these protocols still have the following deficiencies:(1)In the existing LR AKE,complex Leakage-Resilience tools are used are generally used,which leads to complex protocol design and low efficiency.(2)The current LR AKE protocol is based on two-party authentication key exchange,there is no authentication key group key exchange(AGKE)protocol.To address these issues,this paper proposes an efficient Leakage-Resilience two-party authentication key exchange protocol and Leakage-Resilience authentication group key exchange protocol.The work includes the following three aspects:(1).This thesis proposes an efficient Leakage-Resilience two-party authentication key exchange protocol.Compared with other related LR schemes,this protocol is superior to other protocols in computing efficiency and communication efficiency without reducing security requirements.In this thesis,the CK safety model is extended under the computation-only leakage model,and a continuous after-the-fact leakage-resilient(CAFLR)model is proposed for AKE;then,combined with the pseudo-random function,bilinear mapping and the difficult problem of CDH,an efficient Leakage-Resilience AKE protocol is proposed;and the CAFLR CK protocol security is formalized under the standard model?(2)This thesis uses the development library GMP-6.2.0(GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic,GMP),PBC-0.5.14((Pairing-based cryptograph,PBC),OpenSSL(Secure Sockets Layer,SSL)under the environment of the operating system Ubuntu 18.04 Implemented our proposed LR AKE protocol,Shim protocol,Wu2018 protocol.By analyzing and comparing the execution time of this protocols,compared with traditional solutions such as the Shim protocol,the new protocol achieves Leakage-Resilience safety but only adds a small amount of calculation.Compared with other Leakage-Resilience solutions such as the Wu2018 protocol,the new protocol has high execution efficiency and can be applied to the actual environment such as Internet of Thing to resist side channel attacks.(3).This thesis presents Leakage-Resilience Group Authentication Key Exchange(LR AGKE)protocol.Compared with related non-LR solutions,the proposed AGKE protocol has Leakage-Resilience security features without incurring excessive additional communication and calculation costs.This thesis first proposes the AGKE-resistant bounded after-the-fact leakage-resilient(BAFLR)model.The participant will return the internal secret part to the attacker and launch it in the challenger.then,by appropriately combining the Diffie-Hellman Group Key Exchange Protocol(DH GKE)and the CPLA2 secure public key,The first LR AGKE protocol was proposed;finally,the new protocol was proved to be safe by BAFLR CK under the standard model based on game sequence technology.