Research On Management Of P2P Lending Platform Based On Social Network

P2P lending platform is a specialized two-sided platform of Internet finance,which connects lenders and borrowers,and facilitates both sides to complete transactions.In recent years,Internet finance has become popular.More and more social network platforms choose to enter the P2 P network lending market to expand P2 P lending business.Some native online lending platforms also try to reduce the credit risk of bilateral users based on social network.In this context,the support role of social network is becoming more and more significant,which adds new vitality to P2 P lending platform market,as well as market competition.Under this background,research consisting of pricing,user management and competition of P2 P lending platform with social network background in monopoly and duopoly market is of great significance.Firstly,the pricing of monopoly P2 P lending platform under social network background is studied.We mainly investigate the cross-platform network effect brought by social network platform on optimal transaction rates,numbers of bilateral users and profit of the P2 P lending platform.Research shows that P2 P lending platform will set a high price for one side of users who are more sensitive to cross-platform network effect,and a low price for the other side of users.The numbers of borrowers and lenders joining the platform increase with the increase of cross-platform network effect perceived by bilateral users.When the cross-platform network effect coefficient perceived by borrowers is small,the platform profit decreases with the increase of cross-platform network effect coefficient perceived by lenders.otherwise,it will increase with the increase of cross-platform network effect coefficient perceived by lenders.Then,study the monopoly P2 P lending platform which has access to borrowers' social information,by introducing the variable of social reputation threshold,the profit model of P2 P lending platform is established.The problem of whether and when the P2 P lending platform needs to establish the threshold of borrowers' social reputation is studied.The result shows that when lenders are extremely sensitive to borrowers' social reputation,the platform needs to set the borrowers' social reputation threshold.At this time,the P2 P lending platform implements the inclined pricing strategy of setting high prices for lenders and subsidizing borrowers.When the P2 P lending platform strengthens the lenders' sensitivity to the borrowers' average social reputation level,it will reduce the number of borrowers,increase the number of lenders and its profits.Finally,consider the duopoly competition of online lending market,which coexists with the common P2 P lending platform and the P2 P lending platform under the social background.By introducing the factors of user base and brand switching cost,the two competitive platforms with different average interest rates are studied,and the optimal pricing of the two platforms for bilateral users are obtained.The analysis shows that the user base and brand switching cost will increase the market share and profit of the self-owned P2 P lending platform,expand its competitive interest rate range.If the average interest rate of the P2 P lending platform under the social network is higher than that of the common P2 P platform,when borrowers are more sensitive to the average interest rate of the platform,the former needs to reduce the transaction rate set for borrowers;when lenders are more sensitive to the average interest rate of the platform,it needs to raise the transaction rate set for borrowers.When borrowers' brand switching cost is much higher than that of lenders,as the proportion of basic users of the social network platform increases,it will decrease the transaction rate set for lenders and increase the transaction rate set for borrowers.