A Terminal Location Verification Protocol For Collusion Attack

The network is composed of terminal devices and is closely related to them in the aspect of security.As the components of the network,the security of terminal devices is of great importance.As one of the numerous security problems of terminal device,the security for terminal's location is very important,especially for some terminal devices which are locat-ed in sensitive areas.However,the current research on the verification of the location for terminal device cannot resist the collusion attack.Based on the above requirements,our con-tribution focuses on the location verification of terminal devices in sensitive locations,and designs a location verification protocol which combines BRM model and trusted computing system.The protocol can resist collusion attacks.In doing so,we make the following contributions:First,we construct the system model of the terminal device location verification protocol,analyse the security threat and the adversary attack model and then propose the security goal of the protocol.Then we propose a location verification protocol for terminal devices based on position based cryptography and trusted computing.The protocol can resist collusion attacks.Finally we prove the security of the proposed protocol using the combination proof method under the Protocol Composition Logic model and analyse the actual implementation of the proposed protocol.In the phase of the implementation we divide the starting operation process of the terminal device into four phases and apply the proposed protocol to them.The location verification protocol of the terminal device proposed in this thesis can resist collusion attacks by using BRM model.In addition,the protocol can defend against man-in-the-middle attacks by using trusted computing.Finally,the protocol has better scalability and higher feasibility by combining TPM and BRM model.