Executive' Promotion, Media Supervision And Executive' Private Benefits

The current incentive system of Chinese enterprises mainly includes salary incentive,equity incentive and promotion incentive.Due to the existence of Salary Regulation and equity incentive system is still in its infancy,promotion incentives can to some extent compensate for the other two kinds of incentives.The special principal-agent problems of state-owned enterprises and the quasi official nature of executives make the executives of state-owned enterprises pay more attention to the results of invisible incentives-Pursuing promotions and private benefits.The existing research shows that the promotion incentive is like a double-edged sword,to "performance on" view of the scholars in favor of highly self promotion incentive executives,reduce the self serving behaviors,through improving management efficiency and business performance to achieve the goal of promotion;and to "on" view of the scholars of promotion incentive will lead to self-interest executives intensifies officials in order to running and maintaining the image.Since the eighteen anti-corruption trend,top management corruption has been greatly curbed.However,private benefits are hard to find because of the hidden form,but there is an upward trend.Whether the promotion incentive of the state-owned enterprises can reduce the agency cost and suppress the private income as expected is worth studying.Based on the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies in 2009-2016,we consider the different forms of private income of top executives of state-owned enterprises-excess on-the-job consumption and excess money pay and its combined value,and study the correlation between executives' promotion incentives,media supervision and executives' private benefits.The results show that: 1.in state-owned enterprises,the executives with promotion incentives will reduce their private income,especially the excess money pay for the central enterprises and the excess on-the-job consumption of local state-owned enterprises.2.the addition of media supervision to the external governance mechanism has enhanced the correlation between promotion incentives and private benefits of executives.The conclusion of this paper enriches the research results of the combination of internal and external governance mechanism in a certain degree,and provides a reference for the management of the private income of the state-owned enterprises in practice.