Managerial Power,Media Coverage And Executive Compensation

In recent years,there have been more and more reports on executive pay at home and abroad,which have gradually become the focus of domestic and foreign media and have received more and more attention from the public.The high-frequency exposure of the domestic and foreign media to executive compensation has made the existence of some of the sky-high salary public.During the financial crisis of recent years,the U.S.government has provided a certain degree of subsidy to company executives in order to help listed companies survive the difficult times.At the same time,these executives still receive high salaries.This is also the case in our country.Frequently seen.In this regard,the Chinese government uses a variety of means to supervise the pay of executives,among which there is no lack of media supervision and governance.The main purpose of this study is:First,find evidence of the impact of media coverage on the executive compensation of listed companies.Second,through the media coverage of executive compensation governance effect,to improve China's top executives pay system,to establish effective incentive mechanism to provide a theoretical basis for the government and listed companies in the development of executive compensation policy process For reference.Based on the research background and research significance,this paper reviews the domestic and foreign literatures on media supervision,executive control and executive compensation,and comments on relevant literature.In the part of empirical analysis,this paper takes Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2016 as samples,and uses multiple regression model to test:First,it studies the impact of executive control as internal governance on executive compensation.Second,take the executive control of the relationship between executive pay as the main study of this article standpoint,as the external supervision of media supervision as an entry point to explore how it affects senior management control and executive compensation Relationship between.Third,we study separately the impact of negative media coverage and non-negative media coverage,official media coverage,and non-official media coverage on executive remunerationThrough theoretical analysis and empirical tests,the following conclusions are drawn:(1)Executives have higher control power and higher pay levels.(2)When the supervision of the media was cut into both executive control and executive compensation,it was found that its regulatory effect on the relationship between executive control and executive compensation was negative.Among them,media negative reports are non-negative reports compared to the media,and official media reports are more regulated than non-official media reports.The innovations of this paper are:(1)Data sources.The use of new media(Hexun.com)to collect media coverage data has broken the past practice of using newspapers and other methods of collecting data using old media.The coverage of new media is wide,and the comprehensiveness and accuracy of media data have been improved.(2)Technological innovation.Octopus models were used to collect data instead of previous manual searches.(3)Content innovation.This article divides media reports into two types.The negative media reports and media non-negative reports,official media reports,and non-state media reports respectively studied their regulatory effects on senior executives' control and executive compensation,enriched the concept of media reports,and made the research more targeted.