| Group-buying online is a prevalent Internet-based business mode.The main feature of group-buying is that the size of volume discount depends on the increase of demands.The group-buying based auction theory is a multiparty success business model including consumers,businesses and mechanism operators.Participants can take their own needs and optimize the allocation of resources.As an interactive platform between merchants and consumers,group-buying websites sell merchandise to consumers.In view of the different types of commodities sold by different businesses,it is worth discussing that how to distribute commodities effectively and bring value to businesses and consumers.This is a key issue for group-buying online to allocate commodities reasonably and effectively,and calculate the pricing for the allocation.The auction theory and design of algorithm mechanism provide an opportunity to design efficient allocation mechanism and pricing mechanism for group-buying online.It makes that group-buying mechanism which is based on auction mechanism has the economic attributes such as individual rationality and incentive compatibility.In recent years,applying heuristic algorithm to work out the winner determination problem is becoming more and more extensive.In this context,this paper studies the allocation and pricing of commodities in the online group-buying problem.Researches on allocation and pricing mechanism of group-buying model are mainly based on continuous price function.The traditional decentralized group-buying mechanism ignored the contributes of different participants and cannot overcome the influence of the false reports on the group-buying mechanism.In view of above problem,we propose an incentive compatible mechanism based on the continuous price function.The mechanism determines the equilibrium price and the qualities of transactions according to the price function.It also applies VCG mechanism to determine prices.Through theoretical proof and a large number of data simulation experiments,the economic attributes of the mechanism is verified.Researches on allocation and pricing mechanism of group-buying model are based on fixed bidding prices.According to the influence of the buyers' bidding price and demands on the participants,the concept of relevant importance is put forward to determine the allocation and pricing of the buyers.Thus,the individual utility of the higher relevant importance buyer is improved.It also proved that the mechanism satisfies some economic attributes by means of theoretical proof and simulation experiments,and the experiment shows that it can bring higher utility to the buyers.Researches on allocation and pricing mechanism of group-buying model are based on combinatorial double auction.Introducing the concept of unit difference aims to work out winner determination problem in the combinatorial double group-buying auction mechanism.In the process of determining the winning buyers,the mechanism selects the right seller directly whose reported cost is minimal.In this way,the mechanism guarantees the social surplus.The mechanism also applies VCG pricing mechanism to calculate the payment of buyer according to the unit difference of the overlapped buyer and to pay the expenses to the matched sellers.It can avoid buyers reporting dishonestly.Through theoretical proof and a large number of data simulation experiments,it is proved that the mechanism satisfies the economic attributes of individual rationality,budgetary balance and incentive compatibility. |
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