Executive Gender?Corporate Risk And Pay-Performance Sensitivity

Top managers control the daily business operations of the company and grasp the direction of the company's development.Effective executive compensation incentives can reduce the inconsistent interests between managers and business owners,reduce agency costs and enable enterprises to get better development.Therefore,the research on the factors affecting the sensitivity of pay to performance has always been a hot topic of current scholars.At present,China's economy has entered a period of profound transformation,the growth rate is slowing down,the quality of growth is increasing,the pressure on economic downturn is obvious,structural imbalances have emerged,and all kinds of contradictions arise.Under this background,the enterprises in our country are facing the challenge of industrial transformation and structural upgrading,and the business risks of the enterprises are increasing.In addition,although the current development of China's economy has created opportunities for many women,in China's traditional concept women should be xiangfujiaozi,and women's indecisiveness is also considered to have no managerial potential.Due to the existence of this traditional concept,shareholders in the enterprise have more recognized by male executives and are willing to give them more incentives for salaries to use their unique potential.In view of this,the sensitivity of pay to performance may be different due to differences in the gender of executives.This paper reviews relevant literature on the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance,the characteristics of executives and the sensitivity of pay performance,and the relationship between firm risk and sensitivity to pay performance.We empirically studied the effects of CEO gender differences,corporate risks,and their interactions on the sensitivity of pay to performance.Selected the Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed company from 2003 to 2016 as a research sample.First,we study the influence of CEO gender on executive pay performance sensitivity,and then study the impact of corporate risk on executive pay performance sensitivity.Finally,we study the interaction between CEO gender and corporate risk on executive pay performance sensitivity.Through the empirical study we found that:(1)The sensitivity of pay to performance is influenced by the gender of the CEO.and the sensitivity of the pay performance sensitivity of the enterprise with CEO as the male is higher than that of the enterprise with CEO as the female.(2)There is a significant negative correlation between corporate risk and pay performance sensitivity.That is,rising corporate risks will reduce the positive correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance.(3)Considering corporate risk factors,there is still a significant correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance for enterprises whose CEOs are male,and there is no such correlation in enterprises for whose CEO are female.This may be because corporate risk will reduce the positive correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance,and the sensitivity of pay performance of this time is already at a relatively low level.On this basis,the enterprises whose CEO are female,it's executive pay performance sensitivity is relatively lower,so it's performance based pay of executive has been minimal.In this case,the correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance may not exist.