Research On The Anti-Monopoly Regulation Of Injunctive Relief Of Standard-Essential Patents

With knowledge becoming one of the important bases of economic growth,the disputes over standard-essential patent have been frequently.This is because standards are unified,open,and have their own public attributes.Patents,as representative intellectual property rights,are essentially private rights.The law gives it exclusivity.When the public domain incorporates private rights products,there is bound to be some conflict.The temptation of interest has prompted standard-essential patentees to abuse the legal rights conferred by the intellectual property law,infringing the interests of consumers,which has the effect of restricting and excluding competition.There are disputes in the theoretical and practical fields on how to regulate the abuse of standard-essential patent ban relief.This article hopes to provide a theoretical basis for the use of antitrust regulations to address such issues through a legal analysis of the ban relief of standard-essential patents,the particularity of such acts and their value significance,as well as the legal reasons for the chaos of such acts..At present,chinese anti-monopoly legislation has not yet made a clear response to the issue of remedies for abuse of injunctive relief of standard-essential patent.This article hopes to draw on the practical experience of extraterritorial practice,based on chinese practice,to provide recommendations for antitrust regulations for abuse of injunctive relief of standard-essential patent,clarify the specific antitrust analysis framework,and better achieve the balance of interests of relevant parties.The full text is divided into four chapters.The first chapter takes the definition ofrelated concepts in injunctive relief of standard-essential patent as the starting point,analyzes the dual impact of the combination of technology and standard on market competition,and discusses the standard-essential patent and the injunctive relief of standard-essential patent.The particularity points out that the injunctive relief of standard essential patents will affect the order of competition,and concludes that the abuse of injunctive relief should be regulated to a certain extent.The second chapter analyzes the regulatory path of the abuse of standardessential patent injunction relief,and points out the shortcomings of the path of contract law and patent law,demonstrates the rationality and effectiveness of the regulation by using the anti-monopoly law,and points out that the anti-monopoly law should be one of the basic laws regulating the abuse of the injunctive relief of standard-essential patent,and proposes that regulate injunctive relief of standard-essential patent as an independent type of abuse of market dominance.The third chapter discusses how to determine that the standard-essential patentee has market dominance,and that the standard-essential patentee has market dominance is a prerequisite for the abuse of market dominance.When making specific judgments,the role of market share should be correctly understood,different standards should be considered,and the countervailing power of counterparties should be measured.It is pointed out that the judgment of market dominance should be comprehensively recognized.The fourth chapter studies the anti-monopoly law experience of EU in regulating the abuse of standard-essential patent injunctive relief,and analyzes the antitrust defence conditions in the Orange Book Standard case,the European Commission's safe harbor rules,and the Huawei v.ZTE.This paper summarizes the rules on how to determine that injunctive relief constitutes abuse of market dominance,propose a comprehensive proposal for the identification of injunctive relief in the standard essential patentee in China,clarify the analytical framework of the antitrust regulations for the injunctive relief of standard-essential patent,and pay attention to the the rationality of license fees.On the basis of respecting the freedom of negotiation between the two parties,moderate intervention in the antitrust law isexpected to better achieve the balance of interests.