Research On Executive Compensation Information Disclosure System Of Listed Companies In China

In the 1830 s,the institutional form of the modern company was becoming more and more mature,which promoted the theoretical research on corporate economics and law.The senior level of the company's management structure,the executives in this article,are hired by the owners of the company to manage specific matters within the company.Agency theory holds that this division of labor ultimately results in the separation of ownership and management.From the perspective of the company owners,they expect the company executives to fulfill their duty of loyalty and diligence and conduct professional management.In order to eliminate the conflicts of interest between investors and managers in the operation of the company as far as possible,the executives can not only inevitably pursue self-interest,but also help the shareholders to maximize the value increase.The owners use equity as incentive compensation,so as to strengthen the cohesion between the executive compensation and the company's performance.However,in recent years,equity incentive compensation has been used indiscriminately,and the proportion has been increasing,leading to the continuous rise of executive compensation.Sky-high compensation has stung the nerves of the public and caused social "public indignation".The reason lies in the fact that the executives directly deprive the shareholders of their right to speak in the salary negotiation through self-dealing,make favorable rules to boost the salary level,and then conceal this information,which makes the company and shareholdersunable to supervise them because they are not aware of it.Such distortion and alienation also occur in the executive compensation of listed companies in China.Before the equity incentive management method of listed companies(trial)came into effect,listed companies represented by ping an of China had started to adopt the equity incentive compensation model in China.Due to the lack of legal guidance,the first wave of sky-high executive compensation of listed companies hit China under this compensation model.The pay may not be high enough to justify legal intervention,but since the global financial crisis,the decline in corporate performance has been in stark contrast to the outsize pay packages that have cropped up frequently.It is because of this series of events that the listed companiesexecutive compensation system of in China has been criticized that the reform process of relevant system in China has been promoted.The deep distortion and dissimilation of the executive compensation system of listed companies also occur in the executive compensation of listed companies in China.Listed companies represented by ping an of China began to adopt the compensation model of equity incentive before the promulgation of the equity incentive management method of listed companies(trial).Due to the lack of legal guidance,the first wave of sky-high executive compensation of listed companies came to China under the compensation model.The pay may not be high enough to justify legal intervention,but since the global financial crisis,the decline in corporate performance has been in stark contrast to the outsize pay packages that have cropped up frequently.It is because of this series of events that the executive compensation system of listed companies in China has been criticized that the reform process of relevant system in China has been promoted.According to the economic theory of market failure and principal-agent,the information disclosure system is beneficial to the transparency of compensation information and the rationalization of compensation decision,so as to promote the capital market to return to rationality and truth.The empirical research results of scholars have proved that although information disclosure cannot directly inhibit executive compensation,it can enhance its sensitivity and correlation with corporateperformance.Europe and the United States on the study of information disclosure system in the developed countries are far more than our time and depth,to evaluate the role of a system in terms of the size is visible "survivors",and from the result of the development of market economy have played a positive role,also for our country to develop has to adapt to the local soil and water conservation information disclosure system to bring inspiration.Article altogether is divided into four parts,the first part is straight throws the current executive compensation of listed companies in our country legal regulation for executive pay and average pay gap between disparity,a limited number of problems associated with corporate performance,and the principal means of introduction and the evaluation of the current legal regulation,after the comparative analysis put forward compensation disclosure system should be the key to solve the problem of compensation;The second part,based on the theory of market failure and principal-agent,demonstrates the legal basis of the disclosure of executive compensation information,and dialectically analyzes the positive value and negative impact of information disclosure system in dealing with executive compensation,and emphasizes the unique role of information disclosure system.The third part combs the current legislation system of compensation information disclosure system of listed companies in China,investigates the disclosure status,and summarizes the problems existing in the practice of compensation information disclosure system.The fourth part,combined with the practice of compensation disclosure system in developed countries outside the region,puts forward four specific Suggestions for the improvement of China's executive compensation disclosure system,including optimizing the means of information disclosure,expanding the scope of information disclosure,enhancing the transparency of compensation decision-making,and improving the responsibility of defective disclosure.