| The construction of guaranteed housing has strong guaranteeing and public welfare.The introduction of Public-Private Partnership(PPP)model can give full play to the advantages of both government and social capital.The cooperation between government and enterprise enhances the long-term and stability of the development of guaranteed housing in China.However,the development of PPP model in China is relatively short,imperfect of laws and regulations.Many uncertain reasons made social capital in PPP projects may be breached to damage public interests.As a single supervisor,government departments are facing enormous challenges in supervision,which hinders the development and application of PPP model to a certain extent.This paper focuses on exploring the incentive role of reputation in the operation of PPP project in the guarantee housing,so as to enable the public to participate in supervision,help government departments better restrain the behavior of social capital,and achieve effective supervision.This paper lays a scientific theoretical foundation for the development because it summarizes the concepts and theories related to the PPP project of guarantee housing at first.Starting from the stakeholders of PPP project,it is analyses the principal-agent relationship and also the cooperative relationship of sharing risks and interests between government and enterprises in PPP project of guarantee house.In the process of project operation,effective supervision can ensure the smooth progress of the project.At present,there are some problems in supervision,such as imperfect laws and regulations,lack of regulatory role,lagging regulatory links and so on.Therefore,the behavior of social capital can not be completely restrained only by the supervision of government departments or the regulatory role of the market.Therefore,this paper introduces reputation in the process of project supervision,considering that public participation in supervision can play a leading role in reputation,and help the government better regulate the behavior of social capital.Emphasis is laid on the evolutionary game model when reputation is considered or not.Analyses the influence of reputation on social capital and government departments from the perspective of dynamic evolution,and exerts the restraint role of reputation on the behavior of the players,and puts forward four policy recommendations.In order to play the restraint role of reputation mechanism under the condition of imperfect laws in our country,we can better regulate the behavior of social capital,reduce the opportunistic behavior of social capital,improve the supervision level of government departments,and provide reference for government departments to formulate reasonable supervision strategies. |
