Research On The Impact Of Local Government Competition On The Mismatch Of Labor Resources

Local government competition plays an important role in promoting China’s economic growth and optimizing the allocation of resources.However,with the reform of fiscal and taxation and administrative system,local governments gradually have relatively independent financial and administrative powers,and local governments’ pursuit of their own interests has become more and more legalized.Under the dual incentives of fiscal decentralization and political promotion championships,local governments’ interference in competition for their own interests has been distorted.To a certain extent,this worsens the misallocation of labor resources,resulting in the loss of economic efficiency.Therefore,clarifying the impact mechanism of local government competition on the mismatch of labor resources and exploring how to regulate local government competition behavior become the key link to realize the optimal allocation of labor resources.Firstly,this paper analyses the mechanism of the influence of local government competition on the mismatch of labor resources,and then understands the logical relationship behind it.On the basis of dividing local government competition into normative competition and anomie competition,the game model of local government competition is constructed.The analysis shows that,in the allocation of labor resources,local governments are prone to lack of normative competition and excessive anomalous competition based on their own interests maximization,which ultimately leads to anomie of local government competition and loss of economic efficiency.Secondly,the theoretical model of labor resource mismatch calculation is constructed,and the mismatch degree of labor resources in three industries in China is measured.The calculation results show that,from the perspective of regional dimension,there are obvious spatial distribution differences in the mismatch degree of labor resources in various regions of China.Among them,the areas with the most serious labor resource mismatch in the primary industry are Ningxia,Inner Mongolia,Shaanxi,Shanxi,etc.Henan,Shandong,Qinghai,Gansu,Chongqing,Guizhou,Hunan and Yunnan;Labor resource mismatch in eastern coastal areas is generally low.The area with the most serious labor mismatch in the second industry is concentrated in the eastern coastal area.Beijing,Tianjin,Hebei and Shandong take the second place;Henan,Shanxi,Anhui,Jiangxi,Chongqing,Sichuan,Liaoning and Heilongjiang are at medium level.The most serious region of the third industry’s labor resource mismatch is concentrated in the northwest;the region of Inner Mongolia,Hubei,Anhui,Chongqing and other regions is the second,and the degree of mismatch between the labor resources in the eastern coastal cities is relatively low.From the industrial dimension,the first industry labor resource mismatch problem is the most serious,the third industry labor resource mismatch degree has fallen,and the second industry labor resource mismatch problem is worsening.Finally,through the index of local government competition agency variables,the paper empirically examines the impact of local government competition on the mismatch of labor resources.The conclusion shows that the local government competition has played a deteriorating role in the mismatch of labor resources in different regions,but the effects on different industries are different.The competition of local government expenditure can alleviate the mismatch of labor resources in the secondary and tertiary industries,but worsens the mismatch of labor resources in the primary industry.Local government tax competition has a worsening effect on the mismatch of labor resources in the secondary and tertiary industries,but the influence on the primary industry is not significant.Competition for local government investment has worsened the mismatch of labor resources in various industries in various regions.Therefore,this paper proposes that it is necessary to restrain the local government’s competitive behavior through the super-local government decision-making bodies in order to optimize the allocation of labor resources.Specifically,we can adopt the ways of rewarding the local government’s normative competition,punishing the local government’s anomalous competition and strengthening the communication and cooperation among local governments.