| The pilot of the A-share registration system was accompanied by the establishment of the Science and Technology Board and finally entered the stage of China's capital market.For a long time,the capital market issuance and approval system has gone through the examination and approval system to the approval system,and the strict control of “market access” has remained unchanged.Faced with stringent hard requirements and repeated IPO restarts and suspensions,companies often face high cost of listing and time.Under the "Oak Lake" of the IPO and the listing appeal of enterprises,the A-share "shell resource" transaction came into being and became one of the unique phenomena accompanying the development of the capital market.When a listed company chooses a backdoor object,the shell company's own industry,business performance,financial situation,etc.will become its consideration indicators.However,the ultimate facilitation of the backdoor listing,or not only related to the intention of the backdoor,but also driven by the “invisible hand” of the market,will also be greatly affected by the “visible hand” imposed by the local government.For local governments,they need to face the “vertical competition” between central and local governments measured by fiscal decentralization,and the “horizontal competition” derived from promotion to the ultimate goal under centralized centralization.Specifically,due to the mismatch between local financial power and power after the tax-sharing reform,local governments have frequently encountered problems such as land finance and local debt in order to obtain as much as possible the incentives for substantial fiscal revenue.As a listed company's important tax source,local governments tend to promote the trading of shell resources within the jurisdiction to ensure the stability of tax revenue.In addition,after the tax-sharing reform,local governments have strengthened the control of financial resources in the region,while listed companies have the qualifications for financing in the capital market and the intangible endorsement of credit.The loss of shell resources means the narrowing of financing channels.Therefore,local governments have strong incentives for the resources of listed companies.In economic terms,the central and local governments have formed a fiscal decentralization,and the centralization of power in the political center has driven local officials to compete around promotion.Due to the information asymmetry between the central and local governments,in order to identify the efforts of local officials as efficiently as possible,some simple relative performance indicators have become the reference standards of the central government.The number of listed companies in the region is one of the important indicators to demonstrate the degree of economic efforts of local officials in the development of the jurisdiction in this political environment.This means that,for political performance objectives,local governments also have a strong incentive to leave liquidity of shell resources in the province rather than increase the interests of other provinces.In addition,local state-owned listed companies are more special in the nature of shell resources.Compared with private enterprises,local governments have control over their income.Therefore,as far as possible,the listed company has the same nature after borrowing the shell,and it has become the second demand for pursuing transactions within the same region.In summary,under the dual pressure of fiscal decentralization and local government competition,local governments will have the dual motivation to avoid the exchange of shell resources and avoid the changes in the nature of local SOEs.The existing literature has limited research on shell resource trading,and one of the constraints in data availability research.Since there are a large number of cases that have been identified by the Securities and Futures Commission as being listed as backdoors,few databases provide comprehensive statistics.In this paper,through manual collection and sorting,a total of 411 cases of backdoor listings from 1997 to 2017 were compiled to minimize the impact of limited data samples on the research conclusions.The specific research framework of this paper is as follows:The first part is the introduction.First of all,it explains the research background of this paper,that is,shell resources as one of the unique phenomena that exist in China's capital market for a long time.Beyond the market's role in resource allocation,local government intervention cannot be ignored.Empirically,does the local government really significantly affect the trading characteristics of shell resources? This issue has practical research value.Subsequently,the key concepts in the study were defined.That is,the contents of the shell company,the backdoor listing,and the shell resource trading are defined in detail.It should be noted that,in view of the fact that it is not uncommon to evade the listing of backdoors,the definition of backdoor listing in this paper will be significantly wider than the definition in the “Administrative Measures for Major Asset Restructuring of Listed Companies”.In addition,this paper defines the core keyword shell resource as: under the existing issuance approval system,it has the property of listed company qualification,because of its poor performance and small market value,it makes it tradable special.assets.Furthermore,the research methods,research framework,innovations and deficiencies in this paper are briefly described one by one.The above is the entire content of the introduction.The second part is a theoretical overview and literature review.From the perspective of research,this paper assumes that the “vertical competition” represented by fiscal decentralization and the “horizontal competition” represented by local government competition have the motives that affect the trading of shell resources.Therefore,the relevant theories and the current research situation are separately sorted out.On the one hand,from the perspective of fiscal decentralization,there are mainly the first generation of fiscal decentralization theory represented by Tiebout,which is based on the existence of local government;and the introduction of contract theory,suggesting that incentive mechanisms should be considered to make local governments The second generation of fiscal decentralization theory compatible with resident welfare,namely market-maintained federalism.From this,the decentralization system experience has shifted from the initial discussion of public goods supply to a broader research field with economic growth and local government behavior.The existing research can be summarized from three sub-divisions: fiscal decentralization and economic growth,fiscal revenue decentralization,and fiscal expenditure decentralization.Through the combing of the literature,this paper finds that the selection of indicators for fiscal decentralization is one of the core issues.On the other hand,local government competition is mainly based on the classic political bidding theory.In addition to the study of competition and regional economic growth,more and more literatures combine fiscal decentralization with local government competition to deepen related issues.the study.In addition,this paper briefly describes the existing research enterprise IPO and the literature on backdoor listing and shell resource trading,but the number is small.This article is devoted to the selection of new perspectives based on manual data,in order to supplement the research,in order to promote the effect of jade.The third part is the analysis of the motivation and means of local government intervention in shell resource trading.Based on the theoretical analysis of the second part and the analysis of the Chinese tax-sharing system and the objective facts of the political environment,this paper intends to sort out the motivations and means of local government intervention.Specifically,this paper reviews the historical evolution of fiscal decentralization,and briefly describes the dynamic changes in central and local financial and administrative rights from the establishment of the new China to the tax-sharing reform.On the other hand,under the political background of centralization of central government,the central government and local governments have long-term “multi-task commission contracts”,and the central government tends to choose some simple relative performance indicators as the standard for considering the degree of effort.This led to the local government's pursuit of political achievements,in order to obtain as many opportunities for promotion,it launched a competition for various liquid resources.The above dual competition environment makes it possible for local governments to intervene in shell resource transactions,such as retaining tax sources,retaining financing channels,maintaining the number of listed companies,demonstrating political achievements,reducing local employment pressure,and retaining the control of state-owned listed companies.It can be administrative or more direct intervention.The fourth part is the model construction and variables.There are two explanatory variables at the core of this paper,one is whether the shell resource transaction is a cross-provincial dumb variable,and the other is the “state-owned enterprise and enterprise enterprise” and the “private enterprise enterpriseowned enterprise”."Dumb variable.In the selection of explanatory variables,this paper has discussed rigorously,and finally selected three indicators: fiscal expenditure decentralization,fiscal revenue decentralization and fiscal freedom.Local government competition uses the actual use of foreign investment(FDI)as a proxy indicator.In addition,the characteristic variables related to local and listed companies are considered as control variables.Another part of this part is the description of data sources and manual finishing standards,mainly focusing on sample screening and processing.The principle of judgment can be summarized as follows: non-special treatment and the change of name of listed company in the case of equity splitting,The change of controlling shareholder or the change of the largest shareholder,the company announced that there is asset replacement(may be less than 100%),the buyer is a non-listed company;in addition to the announcement,financial information for the sample to prove that the data is organized as rigorously as possible.The fifth part is the empirical test analysis.First,descriptive statistics were made for the 1997-2017 shell resource transaction data.Subsequently,on the empirical evidence,fiscal decentralization,local government competition,and the intersection of the two were examined,respectively,for the impact of shell resources on off-site transactions.At this time,the two indicators of fiscal expenditure decentralization and fiscal revenue decentralization were selected.At the same time,the differences in ownership were introduced,and the distinction was made between local state-owned,central state-owned and private enterprises.On this basis,the sub-sample regression was carried out based on the different economic zones,that is,whether the shell resource transactions in the eastern,central and western regions were related to the local government;the sub-sample regression was also based on whether or not the diversified mergers and acquisitions were used as a supplement to the research.In addition,this paper also studies the impact of fiscal decentralization and local government competition on the nature of shell resources.In order to ensure the robustness of the research results,this paper mainly tests from the three aspects of the selection of fiscal decentralization indicators,the establishment of event-dummy variables in the tax-sharing reform,and the consideration of changes in the examination and approval system.The results are relatively stable.The sixth part is the research conclusions and policy recommendations of this paper.The main conclusions of this paper are: fiscal decentralization and local government competition significantly affect shell resource transactions.That is,the higher the level of fiscal decentralization,the more likely the shell resources will present local transactions.The stronger the local government's competitiveness,the greater the probability of presenting the same place.The cross terms of the two also support the above conclusions.On the basis of considering ownership,the probability of the central state's shell resources showing off-site transactions is higher,while the local state-owned enterprises are mostly left in the province.During the sub-sample discussion,the eastern regional shell resource transaction significantly affected the level of fiscal decentralization,but not related to the level of local government competition;while the western region was not associated with both,and was significantly related to the characteristics of listed companies.In diversified mergers and acquisitions,fiscal decentralization and local government competition tend to increase the probability of trading in the same place,while inter-bank mergers and acquisitions have nothing to do with local government competition.When considering the changes in the nature of shell resources,for the nationalization of private enterprises,the higher the level of fiscal decentralization and the stronger the competitiveness of local governments,the greater the possibility of private enterprise.Based on the above research conclusions,this paper proposes policy recommendations.The main contributions of this paper are: First,the perspective is novel.This paper chooses from the "horizontal and vertical" competition faced by local governments to study the impact of local government's "visible hand" on the characteristics of shell resource transactions.After conducting full-sample and sample-sample regression,this paper draws conclusions that are different from existing research as a supplement to the research in this field.Second,the data is more detailed.This article is based entirely on data collected by hand.Compared with the existing research results,the sample time of the backdoor listing is longer and the case is more abundant.Third,the selection of indicators is more rigorous.The paper uses four proxy indicators of core explanatory variables to ensure the robustness of the results as much as possible,and to some extent circumvent the low credibility of the results of the bias in the selection of existing research. |
PDF Full Text Request