The Studies Of America Bankrutcy Cramdown Rule

The bankruptcy Cramdown Rule is a legal system in which some parties oppose the draft reorganization plan and the court approves the draft reorganization plan by ruling according to the strict conditions prescribed by law when the draft reorganization plan cannot be adopted.Therefore,compulsory approval is often regarded as the interference of public power in private rights,the parties have no space for autonomy of will,and interfere with Party Autonomy in the name of protecting public interests.The legitimacy of compulsory approval system is based on party autonomy of will.That is to say,it is still impossible to adopt the draft reorganization plan on the basis of full autonomy of the will.Only then can the involvement of compulsory approval power be justified.Starting from the protection of the rights of ordinary creditors in Jiangxi Saiweiqiang case especially the right to know information and autonomy of will.this paper studies the compulsory approval system of bankruptcy reorganization in the United States.Based on the compulsory approval system of bankruptcy in the United States,it analyses that the rights of ordinary creditors in Jiangxi Saiweiqiang case are protected under the compulsory approval system of bankruptcy in the United States.Compulsory approval in the United States needs to comply with the provisions of Sections 1129(a)and(b)of the United States Bankruptcy Act,as well as with the principle of absolute priority extended by judicial precedents and the principle of fairness and equity in Section 1129(b)(1).On the surface,the absolute priority principle is to protect the priority interests of the parties in the bankruptcy reorganization,which is the priority interests formed before the bankruptcy reorganization.The formation of priority interests is a legal act,that is,the majority of bankruptcy is the priority interests formed on the premise of Party autonomy.Absolute priority to protect priority interests is to protect the party’s autonomy of willbefore bankruptcy.The principle of minimum voting group acceptance is that at least one creditor’s right group affected by the adjustment of rights and interests accepts the reorganization plan.It protects the draft reorganization plan that all creditor’s right groups affected by the adjustment of all rights and interests oppose,and the judge decides to adopt it to protect the party’s autonomy.It is the bottom line principle for the party to protect the party’s autonomy in the bankruptcy reorganization.The autonomy of the will is manifested in negotiation and negotiation in the reorganization procedure.Full negotiation and negotiation are needed on the basis of full disclosure of information.This requires full disclosure of information when formulating and voting on the draft reorganization plan.One party has sufficient information,especially debtors and shareholders,while ordinary creditors with the greatest impairment of their rights and interests are in a disadvantageous position of obtaining information.This does not meet the requirements of the principle of fairness and fairness.The draft reorganization plan formulated on this basis is certainly unfair.When reviewing the draft reorganization plan,judges also need to examine the feasibility of the draft reorganization plan.The judgement of feasibility is very difficult because judges are not parties to commercial transactions and it is difficult to judge its feasibility.Judges need full disclosure of information by the obligor of information disclosure when demonstrating the feasibility,so it is only legitimate to make a feasible judgment.This paper studies the compulsory bankruptcy approval system in the United States from the perspective of the protection of the rights of ordinary creditors in the Saiweiqiang ruling in Jiangxi Province.And under the bankruptcy reorganization system of the United States,this paper analyses the protection of the rights of ordinary creditors in the Saiweiqiang ruling in Jiangxi,and expounds the shortcomings and perfection of the compulsory approval system in China.The structure of this paper is as follows:Chapter one starts with the concepts of reorganization plan and compulsory approval,analyses compulsory approval,and studies the value of compulsory approval in reorganization.Chapter two examines the current situation of the compulsory approval system in the United States and analyses how it protects the interests of creditors.Chapter three analyses how to protect the rights of ordinary creditors in Jiangxi Saiwei case,especially the parties’ right to know and autonomy of will when distributing the value of reorganization under the mode of American compulsory approval system.Then it analyses how to remedy the abuse of power when compulsory approval is made.Chapter four analyses the shortcomings of China’s compulsory approval system in protecting the rights of ordinary creditors in judicial practice,as well as improving China’s compulsory approval system by drawing lessons from the U.S.compulsory approval system.