| With the rapid development of economic and trade globalization,investment has become an important driving force for sustained economic growth of enterprises and an important indicator to reflect economic progress.As a fundamental measure of the effectiveness of investment decision-making,investment efficiency will directly affect the company’s financing investment and dividend distribution,thus affecting the company’s operating risk,profitability and capital market evaluation of its operating performance and development prospects.Inefficient investment is relative to the efficiency of the enterprise investment,mainly divided into over-investment and under-investment,over-investment refers to a project whose net present value of investment(NPV)is less than zero.Under-investment refers to a project in which an enterprise gives up its net present value(NPV)greater than zero,inefficient investment will lead to inefficient allocation of funds,affecting the development of enterprises.Therefore,It’s good to prevent and resolve business risks,promote the steady development of listed companies and optimize the efficiency of resource allocation through intensive study in the inherent causes of inefficient investment and its governance mechanism.The investment decisions of enterprises are often influenced by many factors.A large number of domestic and foreign scholars on the efficiency of corporate investment show that the problem of "principal-agent" directly affects the effectiveness and scientificity of corporate investment decisions.In the listed companies with the problem of principal-agent and asymmetric information,the management makes investment decisions that deviate from the best investment level of the company because of private interest,and promotes the production of inefficient investment behavior,thereby damaging the goal of maximizing the value of the company.As the product of the separation of two rights,the essence of executive corruption is a kind of power rent-seeking,and the executive who owns the control of the enterprise may seek for personal benefit by power rent-seeking at the expense of the enterprise investor.In addition,the corruption of senior executives itself will have a serious damaging effect on the internal governance mechanism of the enterprise,reduce the ability of the internal control to the senior executives,easily lead to the abuse of executive power,and irrational behavior in the foreign investment,resulting in the inefficient investment of enterprises.Share-splitting reform has made institutional investors become an indispensable force in the capital market,and as one of the external governance mechanisms of the company,they will play an active role in supervising the company’s decision-making and improving the company’s investment efficiency.Then,whether the increase in the proportion of institutional investors can inhibit the promotion effect of executive corruption on inefficiency investment,which deserves our discussion.Based on the above,this article takes China’s A-share listed companies from2010 to 2015 as a sample to explore the impact of executives’ corruption on inefficient investment and then further examine the intermediary role of institutional investors in the impact of executive corruption on the inefficient investment of enterprises.Inorder to carry on the research to the above-mentioned questions,this article first reviews and finishes the relevant literature both at home and abroad,tries hard to grasp the present situation of the research both at home and abroad;Secondly,some basic theories related to the research of this paper are sorted out,and then the two hypotheses of this paper are analyzed according to these basic theories;Again,on the basis of manual data colleted executives corruption,by Richardson model calculation of A-share listed companies’ investment efficiency from 2010 to 2015 and then build a regression model of the two hypotheses for empirical test and analysis of empirical results;Finally,draw the conclusion of this article.The study found that companies with corrupt executives have a higher probability of inefficient investment behavior.When institutional investors are introduced,the greater the proportion of institutional investors holding shares,the greater their effect on inhibiting the impact of executive corruption on inefficient investment,is that institutional investors’ ownership can significantly inhibit the role of executive corruption in inefficient investment.Further studies found that when the internal control quality and free cash flow level are different,only the low level of internal control and high free cash flow level,the impact of top management corruption behavior on inefficient investment is significant.In view of the above test results,the relevant policies and suggestions are also put forward.The enterprise can establish and improve the corporate anti-corruption mechanism to improve the cost of corruption,strengthen the monitoring efforts of the enterprise free cash flow and reduce the serious negative impact of executive corruption on enterprise investment activities;while maintaining the proper concentration of ownership,introduce institutional investors to improve corporate governance structure,improve the level of internal control,and promote institutional investors to play an active role in investment activities;from the perspective of government and society,we can strengthen the supervision of securities regulators,to increase social media disclosure and urge listed companies to pay more attention to the management of investment activities by increasing external pressure,which is conducive to the enhancement of investment efficiency.In terms of innovation,this paper expands the research on the governance mechanism of inefficient investment in enterprises and the economic consequences of corruption in senior executives,it also enriches the relevant literature,has important guidance and reference significance for solving inefficient investment in enterprises and corruption in senior management. |
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