An Empirical Study On The Legal Implementation Effect Of The Civil Compensation System For False Statements

Our country’s courts began to accept cases of civil compensation for false statements of securitiesin 2002.However,since the establishment of civil compensation system for false statements,it has been subject to criticism and suggestions.These criticisms are mainly focus on the limitations of the pre-program and the lawsuit form.This article collects and sorts out cases of false statement civil litigation by searching the database of judgment documents and listed company announcements.Then uses the prosecution rate,the compensation rate and number of prosecutors to analyze the effect of the legal implementation of the civil compensation system for false statements.Finally,the article will make specific suggestions to improve the performance of this system.This article has six chaptersThe first chapter describes the status quo and problems of the legal implementation of the civil compensation system for false representation of securities.First of all,introducing the basic conditions of civil compensation system for false statements.Secondly,expounding the theoretical goal of the system from the perspective of perfecting nomocracy of the capital market,maintaining trading order and protecting inventor interests.Finally,introducing the realistic issues of the system:First,does the pre-program improperly limit the prosecution?Second,whether our country should introduce class action immediately?The second chapter is the analysis of the rate of prosecution.This article divides the prosecution rate into two types:the absolute prosecution rate and the relative prosecution rate.Trough this analysis,the author have found that the rate of prosecution has been greatly improved in recent years.So it follows that the pre-program has created substantial obstacles to the scale of the lawsuit.At the same time,the main reason for the increase in the rate of prosecution is the active organization of litigation by professional rights attorneys.The third chapter is the analysis of the compensation rate.In recent judicial practice,although the compensation rate is still higher than in the United States,it has a significant decrease compared with previous research data.And investor participation is still not optimistic.This is mainly attributed to the lawyer’s overestimation of the amount of compensation.At the same time,although the auxiliary role of pre-program is still very effective,there has also been a dilemma that the court overturns the administrative penalty of false statement.The fourth chapter shows and analyzes other issues found in research.First,current litigation procedures raise investor’s litigation costs.On the one hand,Exclusion of indefinite population representative’s lawsuit system makes investors need to repeatedly bear the cost of participation,on the other hand,the abuse of litigation rights by defendants companies leads to an increase in the time cost of investors.Second,SFC’s lag in punishment exacerbates the obstruction of the pre-program.The fifth chapter expounds the ways to improve the effect of the legal implementation of the civil compensation system for false statements.First,cancel the pre-program,but need to legally confirm its supporting role.Second,our country should not introduce group action immediately.Third,reform the current litigation system.Finally,establish the alternative dispute resolutions,including mediation center and investor protection fund.The sixth chapter concludes the paper.This chapter comprehensively discuss various problems found in empirical research and summarize the content of the recommendations.