Supervision On M&A From Csrc And Impairment Of Goodwill

With the gradual development of Chinese capital market,mergers and acquisitions of listed companies are rising in both quantity and amount.Especially since the wave of mergers and acquisitions in 2015,the scale of mergers and acquisitions in Chinese A-share market has grown rapidly,and the resulting high-value goodwill has also become a major hidden danger,and exploded in 2018.A large number of listed companies have proposed huge impairment of goodwill.So,as the gatekeeper of auditing merger and acquisition reorganization,does the supervision from China Securities Regulatory Commision(CSRC)after receiving the application of merger and acquisition reorganization of listed companies have certain information value,from which we can see the clues of whether the company will increase the impairment of goodwill in the future?Based on the theory of signal transmission and public interest,Dalian Zeus Entertainment Co.,Ltd.and Zhejiang Jinke Culture Industry Co.,Ltd.are both selected in this paper to explore the relationship of the supervision on M&A from CSRC and the impairment of goodwill with the "goodwill impairment storm".Through sorting out it,we find that the regulatory perspective of the supervision on M&A focuses from CSRC on four aspects:Approval policy,process specification,target assets,stock price and investor return.On this basis,it compares the follow-up operation of the two companies with the matching of the supervision and response documents.It is found that compared with the companies that have not been inquired,the companies that have received the supervision from a regulatory perspective are more likely to cause goodwill impairment in this respect.When the two companies receive similar supervision concerns,the higher the matching degree between the reply content of the listed companies and the subsequent operation,the stronger the persuasiveness of the reply description,and the lower the possibility of goodwill impairment.Therefore,this paper establishes and improves the theoretical framework model between M&A supervision and goodwill impairment,in order to help the follow-up research in this field.Finally,this paper draws inspiration and suggestions: besides the traditional information sources such as annual reports,investors can also refer to the supervision of merger and acquisition restructuring to reduce the risk of information asymmetry with the professional perspective and high degree of supervision;for policymakers,while doing a good job of checking and checking,they should improve the registration system and withdrawal.The supervision system of capital market,such as normalization of the city,makes listed companies responsible for small and medium-sized shareholders.For listed companies,they should respond to policy changes in a timely and flexible manner,choose intermediaries that adhere to the principles of independence,objectivity and justice,and restructure mergers and acquisitions for strategic considerations,improve corporate governance and internal control,and pursue long-term interests.The innovation of this paper is that,as one of the important means for CSRC to audit and supervise,the supervision of M & A and restructuring has received relatively little attention in the academic circles at present,and it is mainly focused on empirical research.The method of case study in this paper is conducive to the in-depth analysis of how typical enterprises reflect the supervision and what follow-up actions they take based on it,and as such starting point to explore the current boom of goodwill impairment is a relatively new attempt,with certain characteristics of the times and innovation,to some extent,it complements and improves the current academic research results in this part of the field.