| Restricted equity incentive is a main mode of corporate equity incentive.It refers to the enterprise to take out part of the equity incentive to complete the agreed performance conditions,and to help the enterprise achieve the purpose of enhancing corporate value,promoting performance development,and attracting retaining talents.And a means of solving the "agent problem" of the existence of the enterprise.The equity incentive plan first appeared in the United States,in order to convert the personal management income of the company’s senior management personnel into personal income tax into property transfer income tax,to help corporate executives avoid tax.With the development of the equity-strength plan,the purpose of tax avoidance has been transformed into the purpose of paying executive compensation to reduce the cash expenditure of the company,and has gradually developed into the current goal of promoting corporate performance improvement,avoiding agency problems and retaining talent.China’s equity incentive system started relatively late.With the promulgation of the Measures for the Administration of Equity Incentives of Listed Companies in 2006 and the Memorandum No.1,No.2 and No.3 on Equity Incentives issued in 2008,the CSRC adopted a new The "Measures for the Administration of Equity Incentives of Listed Companies" and its revision in 2018,China’s corporate equity incentives have developed in a standardized manner.Currently,listed companies that implement equity incentives account for about one-third of all listed companies,half of them Both have chosen the restrictive equity incentive model,which has the restrictive equity incentive model.The reason for the exercise price discount is also that the unlocking conditions and unlocking period of the restricted equity incentive plan can really promote the promotion of corporate value and change the short-sighted behavior of executives.the reason.The new energy industry is one of the national strategic emerging industries actively encouraged and advocated in China’s“13th Five-Year Plan”.This paper selects X New Energy Enterprise,firstly expounds the purpose and significance of this paper,and reads a large number of shares.Based on the literature on the relationship between incentives and corporate performance,the literature review section of this paper was completed;then the theoretical basis,concepts and implementation elements of equity incentives,especially the implementation of restrictive equity incentives,were briefly introduced;The selected enterprise cases are comprehensively analyzed from the aspects of enterprise industrial structure,equity governance structure,financial status,and business results.Financial indicators,event research methods and principal component analysis are used to analyze the financial performance,innovation capability and management behavior of the enterprise.The stockholders’ wealth,the short-term market reaction of investors,and the overall value of thecompany were comprehensively analyzed to determine the effect of the implementation of the restrictive equity incentive plan on the performance and development of the company.Finally,the restrictions imposed on the enterprise through the previous research.Vulnerabilities designed in the Sexual Equity Incentive Program The proposal also pointed out the shortcomings of this paper and the future research direction of the future research on the performance of the restricted equity incentive plan in the new energy industry.It is hoped that it can provide some reference for other new energy companies and non-new energy enterprises to implement the restricted equity incentive plan.he innovation of this paper is mainly to select a relatively new industry,using principal component analysis to measure the change of enterprise value,and provide a new evaluation standard for the study of the implementation of restrictive equity implementation.The difficulty of this paper lies in the main enterprise value evaluation standard or the financial accounting index of the enterprise.The structure of these indicators is affected by the choice of accounting standards and accounting treatment methods,and may be manipulated by the management of the enterprise.Therefore,in addition to selecting financial accounting indicators I have chosen as many non-financial accounting indicators and market value indicators as possible,hoping to more fully reflect the impact of restrictive equity incentives on corporate value,hoping to help the future scholars’ restricted equity incentive research. |