Research On Control Rights Of The Minority Shareholders And Their Corporate Governance Behaviors

From April to October 2015,KONKA’s minority shareholders have been competing for company controls with the large shareholder OCT Group,and have experienced two stages: obtaining and then losing the control rights.This series of events showed that the minority shareholders of listed companies in China had taken actions to change the "vote-with-their-feet",and begun to actively participate in corporate governance.From the perspective of case study,minority shareholders will show different behaviors to govern and supervise the company in order to deal with different agent conflicts in different stages.The existing researches mainly focus on the case study of the control rights of the event itself.In fact,KONKA’s minority shareholders have faced different agency conflicts at different stages and adopted different governance behaviors,which are also valuable.When the large shareholder’s control is threatened and pressured,it will inevitably tighten the controls,and then the agency conflicts and agency problems faced by minority shareholders will absolutely change.It is also under such circumstances that the research of minority shareholders is meaningful.This paper firstly sorts out the literature researches and theoretical basis related to agency conflict and corporate governance.Then it collects policy documents related to corporate governance to support the following case analysis.Secondly,through the rare case of KONKA’s minority shareholders successfully obtaining the company control and the rights of the corporate governance,this paper analyzes the different governance behaviors of minority shareholders under different allocations of rights of corporate governance.By analyzing the governance behaviors and effects,it finds that KONKA’s minority shareholders can improve the governance structure of KONKA Group,and can also supervise and restrict the behaviors of large shareholder.But at the same time,subjected to the short-term interests of the minority shareholders,the behaviors of the large shareholder that catering to that interests preference cannot be effectively monitored.Therefore,this paper believes that majority shareholders should take supervision and restraint as the main behavior,and use the threat of control competition as an auxiliary means to improve the efficiency of corporate governance.The main contributions of this paper are as follows:(1)Under the background of China’s economic reforms and transformations,as well as the gradual improvement of enterprise system,this paper can be a supplement of how to implement corporate governance and active supervision of large shareholders.(2)In practice,as a state-owned shareholder-controlled enterprise,KONKA Croup’s studies of the governance behavior of minority shareholders can also provide supports for the supervision and balance mechanism of the state-owned large shareholders’ governance.