| With the development of the capital market,equity pledge has become a very popular way for shareholders to raise money.Equity pledge provides a relatively convenient and efficient financing method for listed companies,but it also brings many problems,especially for listed companies.The equity pledge of the major shareholder is not only related to the damage caused by the interests of the small and medium shareholders,but also received extensive attention from the academic and regulatory levels.This paper takes Guanhao Biotech as a case.Based on the existing literature,this paper uses principal-agent theory,signal transmission theory and control-rights theory to construct the theoretical framework of controlling shareholder pledge,control transfer and company value.The main problems are as follows: First,holding The motives of shareholders for large-scale equity pledge,the second is how the equity pledge behavior leads to the transfer of actual control of human control,and the third is how the transfer of control affects the value of the company.This paper selects Guanhao Biotech as a case to study.In order to reach the strategic goal of enterprise group,the actual controller of Guanhao has repeatedly raised funds through equity pledge.However,due to the influence of economic environment and industry policies,the proportion of pledge is getting higher and higher and thus entering a crisis.Finally,the ex-actual controller had to get out of the predicament by introducing strategic investors,but also lost his control.The case study shows that as an effective financing method,the shareholder pledge behavior of the major shareholder will alleviate the financial difficulties of the listed company to a certain extent,but the excessive proportion of equity financing also implies extremely high risks.Once the economic environment and market conditions Such changes can easily lead to the loss of control rights and have a negative impact on listed companies. |
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