| Since the launch of the equity split reform in China,the ways of refinancing equity of listed companies have become increasingly diverse.Especially after the China Securities Regulatory Commission promulgated the "Administrative Measures for the Issuance of Listed Companies",the use of private placements to raise funds has high expectations from the regulatory authorities.Compared with public offerings and allotments,private placements have increasingly become the mainstream way for listed companies to refinance their equity due to their low issuance thresholds,simple approval procedures,and flexible funds raised.However,with the increase in the popularity of directional issuance,the phenomenon of benefit transfer exposed therewith has become more and more prominent.The main manifestation is that the benefit delivery in the process of directional additional issuance has a certain degree of concealment,which is difficult to be discovered by small and medium shareholders,resulting in serious infringement of the interests of small and medium investors.At the same time,due to the redistribution of benefits between large and small shareholders,and the combination of multiple factors such as large shareholders with one share and unsound policies and regulations related to private placement in the context of China 's special system,the use of listed companies for private placement by listed shareholders It has created conditions for the implementation of benefit delivery to itself.Therefore,in order to standardize the order of the capital market and protect the interests of small and medium shareholders,it is particularly urgent to study the behavior of interest transfer and economic consequences in the directional additional issuance.This article selects S Company as a research case,which stems from the fact that the value of the assets injected in this directional additional issuance has been multiplied,which has caused widespread concern in the community and is quite typical.By combing a large number of literature materials and combining the relevant theories of directional issuance and benefit delivery,the author deeply analyzes the way and motivation of benefit delivery in the directional issuance process of S company,explores the process ofcapital operation in directional issuance of S company,and analyzes the What kind of benefit delivery chain was formed behind,and what economic consequences did it bring,and finally put forward relevant suggestions for the actual problems to improve the adverse impact of the benefit delivery phenomenon on listed companies and even the capital market in the directional additional issuance.The research of this paper has certain reference significance for perfecting the directional additional issuance system of China's capital market.The research results of this paper show that: S company does have interest transmission behavior in the process of directional additional issuance.It mainly adopts the manipulation of stock issuance price,establishment of shell company to transfer resources,the value of the assets injected by the virtual increase,the large-scale reduction of holdings after the issuance and excessive related transactions And other ways to implement benefit delivery.Further analysis of its motivation shows that the transfer of company S interests is due to the need to strengthen the control of large shareholders and increase the holding of shares at low prices.There are multiple factors such as manipulable loopholes in the directional issuance system,imperfect asset evaluation systems,and inadequate corporate governance mechanisms.Due to superposition.Its economic consequences are mainly reflected in the lack of positive announcement effects in the short-term market and the poor performance of long-term operating performance.Finally,combined with the above research on the phenomenon of profit delivery in the process of S company's directional issuance,the case enlightenment of this article is summarized. |
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