The Research On Capital Appropriation Behavior Of Large Shareholders

With the persistent advancement of market-oriented system in China,the development trend of the securities market has been improving.At the same time,in order to expand the financing ways,cut down the cost of financing,and realize the soaring of enterprise value,more and more enterprises seek listing opportunities through direct or backdoor.However,because of the increasingly complex enterprise governance frame,the regulatory role of major shareholders in taking up the funds of the listed company cannot be fully implemented.In 2005,the relevant departments of China formulated the equity reform plan,planning to strengthen the protection of the lawful rights and interests of small and medium-sized stockholders,to curb the phenomenon of large shareholders occupying the funds of listed companies.However,in recent years,the controlling shareholders through related transactions,capital guarantee or direct borrowing of listed company funds can carry out substantial hollowing out of the event frequently occurred.Among them,in the listed company of family type holding,the phenomenon that big shareholder occupies enterprise capital at will is striking.Therefore,from the perspective of enterprise governance,the paper traces the motives,means,conditions and consequences of capital occupation by major shareholders,and provides a positive reference for how to prevent capital occupation by major shareholders.This paper selects Huaze Cobalt&nickel,a private listed company with family holding,as the research object.Based on the principal-agent problem of major shareholders and small and medium-sized shareholders,this paper analyzes the motivation of capital occupation by Wang family,the controlling shareholder of Huaze Cobalt&nickel.Secondly,based on the information asymmetry theory and transaction cost theory,this paper introduces the implementation conditions of the capital occupation of Wang family.In addition,through the analysis of the means of holding the money of the wang family,it proves the indispensability of the implementation conditions.Finally,from the perspective of efficient market hypothesis and three-dimensional analysis of corporate financial status,the paper illustrates the negative impact of major shareholders' funds on family.Through the above research,it has been confirmed that there are defects in the corporate governance mechanism of Huaze Cobalt&nickel,the excessive concentration of ownership frame,the lack of checks and balances,and the lack of external supervision and many other factors are the culprits of the Wang family's repeated encroachments on the funds of listed companies.Therefore,this paper proposes to optimize the equity frame of listed companies,improves the enterprise governance mechanism,gives full play to the functions of independent directors and boards of supervisors,and expands the financing ways and other constructive advice.