Study On Tunneling Behavior And Economic Consequences Of Controlling Shareholders Under Equity Pledge

Equity pledge is an important financing tool in China's capital market.On the surface,equity pledge is the individual financial behavior of the controlling shareholders,which has no direct relationship with the listed companies.But in fact,the behavior motivation and behavior mode of the controlling shareholders after equity pledge are deeply affected by equity pledge.More and more cases show that there are some relations between the pledge of controlling shareholders' equity and the usurpation of interests.So,will the pledge of controlling shareholders' equity have an impact on their tunneling behavior? What tunneling methods will the controlling shareholders adopt under the pledge of equity? What are the economic consequences for the listed companies and investors caused by the tunneling of controlling shareholders? It is of great significance to study these issues for regulators and listed companies.In view of this,this paper first combs and summarizes the previous scholars' research results on equity pledge and tunneling behavior,defines the key concepts of this paper,introduces information asymmetry theory,principal-agent theory and control right theory,and lays the theoretical foundation of this paper.After that,taking the tunneling behavior under the equity pledge of St Guanfu's controlling shareholders as the research object,using the methods of accounting index research,event research and induction,this paper makes an in-depth analysis of the process,tunneling stage and economic consequences of the equity pledge of the research object,and explores the impact of the equity pledge of the controlling shareholders on the tunneling behavior.The study found that,the high-frequency and continuous equity pledge of controlling shareholders will increase the degree of separation between control right and cash flow right on the one hand,and reduce the tunneling cost of controlling shareholders on the other hand,thus increasing the tunneling opportunity of controlling shareholders.There are many kinds of tunneling methods of controlling shareholders in the context of equity pledge,which will be affected by the proportion of equity pledge of controlling shareholders.These tunneling behaviors seriously damage the interests of small and medium-sized investors and listed companies.Finally,based on the above conclusions,this paper puts forward relevant suggestions for the regulators and listed companies.