Equity Concentration,Related Transactions And Benefit Transfer

Today,when the shareholding of large shareholders has become a common phenomenon in listed companies,related transactions and interest transfer have also occurred more frequently.Related party transactions refer to transactions between the enterprise and related parties.The related parties include the controlling shareholders who have contributed more than 50% of the total capital or have significant voting rights,the actual controller of the company,the directors,supervisors and senior management personnel.It also includes the parent company,subsidiaries,subsidiaries controlled by the same parent company,and joint ventures.Different from other countries,China has had a special period.During this period,large and complicated state-owned enterprises have been reformed,and the most competitive part has been separated into the predecessor of today's listed companies,therefore listed companies are inextricably linked with their own groups or other related companies,and it's no surprise that the frequent occurrence of related transactions.However,due to the short time of the establishment of the securities market and the incompleteness of various rules and regulations,the shareholding structure of listed companies in China appear to be unreasonable.The phenomenon of centralized shareholding and monopoly is more common.And the relevant regulations of the regulatory authorities on this trading activity are still vague and not clear enough,so it has spawned many benefits transfer through the name of connected transactions.The transfer of interests through such channels is ostensibly normal trading,but the transaction price is greatly deviated from the fair price of the market which creates a slope of interest.At present,domestic and foreign scholars focus on the related transactions and interest transfer literature through the construction of corresponding measurement models through macro data to empirically analyze the relationship between the two,and there are few specific cases to dig deeper.This paper combines empirical research with specific cases,supplemented by empirical evidence which provides theoretical basis.Taking the analysis of specific cases as the main,the two echoes,and not only make the theory rise to practice,but also provide a clearer direction for the regulatory authorities and listed companies to improve.The paper creatively combines the concentration of equity with the former two to explore the close relationship between the three by sorting through the literature.This paper first summarizes the current status of connected transactions and the current institutional arrangements,and clarifies the theoretical basis of related transactions and interest transfer and the basic ways of interest transfer,and then selects manufacturing data modeling for empirical analysis paving the way for later case study.The main part is in the context of Tianchang shares with high concentration of shares were exposed to the alleged interest transfer of related party transactions in 2017,and explored the interest transfer and the information disclosure implied by the frequent purchase and sale of Tianchang shares and related party Runyuan Holdings,and the unpaid capital occupation during the reporting period.The problems of falsehood and inconsistency reflect the vulnerabilities reviewed by China's regulatory authorities and the lack of related laws and regulations.