Research On The Contest Of Company Control Under The Highly Dispersed Equity

In 2005,C hina's share-trading reform led to the full circulation of listed companies.The shareholding structure in the capital market gradually changed from “one big share” to “equity share”,which also provided conditions for the company's control.At the same time,C hina's capital market has frequently exploded news that listed companies have been placarded and even evolved into hostile takeovers and internal and external competition for control.In recent years,institutional investors represented by insurance funds have gradually become active in C hina's capital market,providing a large amount of financial support for listed companies,but frequent increases in holdings and placards may not be conducive to the long-term development of both parties.Based on this,this paper mainly focuses on two research purposes:(1)analyzing the reasons for the failure of the management of listed companies to compete for control;(2)evaluating the impact of control rights competition on listed companies.The main contents of this paper are as follows:(1)combing the existing literature,summarizing the basic theory and applied theory,and defining related concepts;(2)manually statistic the current situation of the control rights of listed companies in C hina from 2013 to 2017,analysis the situation of control rights competition under different ownership structures,summing up the motivations and methods of control rights competition,found that listed companies with highly dispersed equity are very likely to break out of external control rights competition,and institutional investors have higher winning rates;(3)introducing the contestants and Rebelling against the party,sorting out t he beginning and end of the control of CSG's control rights,and analyzing the motivation of Baone ng to compete for control;(4)selecting a comparative case and considering internal and external factors,the analysis shows that the reasons of CSG Group's management has failed to control include five aspects:the negative response of major shareholders,the management is too conservative,the lack of anti-contention,the internal control problem and the influence of public opinion are not enough;(5)starting from the three perspectives of corporate governance,management,and stakeholders,selecting non-traditional financial indicators to evaluate the impact of control rights contest on CSG,and found that control rights contest have eased the first type of agency problem of the glass group,but brought the second type of agency problem,and the company's profitability decreased,the solvency deteriorated,important customer loss,research and development strength decreased,cash dividends decreased,b ut also brought certain benefits,such as the improvement of staff quality and social responsibility.There are two main co ntributions of this paper:(1)analyze the situation of control rights competition under the four shareholding structures,and summar ize the ways in which the control rights co ntest for the two sides,which can enrich control rights and co ntest for relevant data;(2)multi-angle analysis the reasons for the failure of the management of the listed company to defend the control rights,focusing on the selection of non-traditional financial indicators to measure the impact of control rights contest on the target company,have certain new and practical significance.Because the author's manual statistical control content competition has certain subjectivity,is not comprehensive and accurate,and is limited by the author's academic level and knowledge reserve,this paper is not perfect enough to analyze the case of CSG's control rights competition.The conclusions are not precise enough,and the recommendations made at the end of the article may not apply to all similar businesses.