Information Disclosure Of River Water Quality

To get rid of trouble of serious water pollution in China in recent years,the central government vigorously promote the establishment and perfection of information disclosure system of river water quality.At the same time,in most of the water pollution control and water resources management policy,the central government set the river water quality standards as the basis of rewards and punishment.However,because of China's river basin water environment characteristics of transboundary externalities and the complex large system features,the local government is the adjacent water quality information of the receiving party,its target interest function often is not consistent with the central government,the game is likely to lead to serious moral hazard problem.Based on existing research at home and abroad,this paper use China's water quality monitoring data of river monitoring of 136 points in 2016,we use four types of water quality indicators:PH value,dissolved oxygen,ammonia nitrogen,potassium permanganate,and use McCrary breakpoint test method to reveal the information of river water quality in the possibility of data manipulation phenomenon;And we choose the main water environment protection policy and economic variables to build the logit model to investigate the central government and local government interest game;Finally,on the basis of the above studies,some countermeasures to improve the information disclosure system of river water quality in China are proposed.The results of this study are found:(1)74%of the cross section of the monitoring data on water quality grade point exists different degree of data manipulation.First the monitoring stations in some parts of the monitoring make data for the low,and data at the top of the part of the monitoring was modified to make it down to grading point below,in order to decrease the water pollution level.Second,the monitoring data in some areas are highly reported for monitoring data,and the data is modified to rise above the classification point,resulting in poor water quality.Third the operation of the monitoring data is in II class and III water quality,water quality III class quality and class IV water quality grade point.(2)To explore the reasons for different data manipulation,logit model is presented in this paper,so we select the main part of the water environment protection policy and economic variables as explanatory variables,it is found that different data manipulation has relations with the game between central government and local government.Different water environmental policy leads to different ways of data manipulation,the main reason of being reported data lowly is the ministry's release of water ecological civilization pilot cities in China policy,the pilot cities in order to complete the acceptance index,complete water environmental assessment target,and the monitoring data are reported lowly.For high data of city,it is mainly because the section is mostly belongs to the national important water source of drinking water,the city will report appropriately high,causing water quality get worse,so as to get more cash.Meanwhile,the monitoring data can also relieve the pressure of future water environment management.Local governments tend to manipulate the low level data,such neither people can be aware easily and achieve the purpose of "improving" the water quality accordingly.So in response to different central government policies,local government adopt different ways of data manipulation,in order to maximize their own interests,thus it appears the game of the central government and local government.Compared with the existing literature,the contribution of this paper lies in:(1)using McCrary(2008)breakpoint test model to identify the behavior of manipulating environmental monitoring data can provides an effective method for discriminating monitoring data fraud.(2)Our data in this paper include the monitoring value of six times of the day,so its results are more scientific and persuasive.(3)We use water quality information as a starting point to research,to reveal the local government and the central government in water environmental governance in the process of interest game.In order to provide empirical support for the environmental information disclosure system and the water pollution control.(4)This paper studies the game between the central government and local government from the perspective of environmental monitoring,and provides another perspective for the study of the relationship between the central government and local governments.