Analysis On The Influence And Countermeasures Of Capital Occupation Of Large Shareholder Of Antai Group

With the birth and development of China's securities market,more and more companies have become listed companies,and listed companies have gradually become an important part of China's market economy.There are large shareholders in the listed companies that can affect the daily operations and strategic decisions of the companies.These large shareholders rely on their own advantages in control rights to occupy the funds of the listed companies in various unobservable ways and transfer benefits to themselves,thereby affecting the normal development of listed companies.The interests of small shareholders have been jeopardized,making the agency conflict between large shareholders and small shareholders increasingly intensifying.Although the regulatory agencies have adopted a series of regulatory measures for large shareholders to use control rights to encroach on the interests of listed companies,these measures have a positive effect on improving corporate governance and promoting the development of listed companies.And to a certain extent,the interests of small shareholders are prevented from being invaded by large shareholders,which promotes the healthy development of China's capital market.However,due to the lack of supervision in China's capital market and the many defects in the internal governance of listed companies,the behavior of large shareholders in occupying listed company funds is still serious,and their means of occupation are also more subtle.Such as the use of reasonably priced connected transactions to occupy the funds of listed company.As a result,small shareholders cannot make correct decisions on their relevant economic activities and losses.Therefore,it is necessary to conduct in-depth research on capital occupation behavior of large shareholders.Shanxi Xintai Iron and Steel Co.,Ltd.,controlled by Li Anmin,a large shareholder of Antai Group,is in the same industry as Antai Group.Since 2006,Antai Group has connected transaction with Shanxi Xintai Iron & Steel Co.,Ltd.In 2014,Antai Group's large shareholder occupied Antai Group's funds of 3.589 billion yuan in related transactions,capital lending and other means.It accounted for 46.24% of the total assets of Aetna Group at the end of 2014,which seriously affected the sustainable management of Antai Group and was issued by an accounting firm with an audit report with an emphasis on matters.In 2016,for reason that the operating expenses of large shareholders amounted to 2.295 billion yuan,Antai Group wasonce again issued by the accounting firm with an audit report with an emphasis section.In addition,Antai Group was also involved in debt litigation for the guarantee associated with its large shareholders.These incidents have seriously affected the normal development of Antai Group and infringed the legal rights of small shareholders and creditors.Through the study of this case,it helps to strengthen the sense of prevention of the infringement of the interests of major shareholders,and enriches the relevant theories of corporate governance.After consulting relevant research at home and abroad,this article summarizes the causes,methods,and related governance measures for capital occupation by large shareholders based on principal-agent theory,corporate governance theory,and property rights theory.On account of the research,the case of Antai Group's large shareholder occupying Antai Group's funds was studied.The analysis found that the large shareholder of Antai Group occupied the funds of Antai Group mainly through related transactions,capital lending and related guarantees.The economic consequences caused by the use of funds mainly affect the Antai Group's solvency,profitability,financing capacity and corporate image.Analyze the reasons why Antai Group is occupied by large shareholders' funds from internal governance and external supervision,that is,the operating conditions of the related party companies are poor,the Antai Group's business is too dependent on related party transactions,the large shareholder is monopolized,the corporate governance mechanism is not perfect,and supervision insufficient strength,etc.From the aspect of legal regulation to evaluate the supervision methods and governance measures for capital appropriation of large shareholders,and introduce the controlling shareholder profit appropriation model to analyze the reasons for the unrestricted use of larger shareholder's capital appropriation behavior,that is,the supervisory authority has insufficient administrative penalties for the capital occupation of large shareholders of listed companies.Based on this,relevant countermeasures are proposed: strengthen external supervision,improve the system of the board of directors,expand the business channels of listed companies,and strengthen the governance role of small shareholders.