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Study On The Large Shareholder's Tunneling Of Zhuhai Zhongfu

Posted on:2019-03-12Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:L M ZhengFull Text:PDF
GTID:2371330545973228Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The shares of listed companies in China are generally concentrated,the problem of agency conflict between major shareholders and minority shareholders is relatively serious.The phenomenon that major shareholders damage the interests of minority shareholders often occurs.In recent years,the supervision of the capital market has been strengthened by China Securities Regulatory Commission.However,the phenomenon of large shareholders tunneling listed companies is still repeated and causes a bad market impact.At the same time,the private equity investment industry in China has developed rapidly in recent years,and the scale of investment continues to rise.The model of private equity investment has also developed from the initial growth investment into a more diversified investment model,and more controlling investments are emerging.It is generally believed that private equity investment can promote the growth and development of the invested enterprises.But private equity investment belongs to financial capital,which has strong speculative and obvious "short sight effect".When private equity investment cannot get enough exit earnings,as a large shareholder,it may be motivated to get profits through tunneling.Zhuhai Zhongfu is a relatively rare example of foreign private equity investment controlling listed companies of China in recent years.Under a series of tunneling behavior of the lager shareholder CVC Capital,Zhuhai Zhongfu gradually became a company with a debt default and stocks facing delisting from a beverage packaging industry giant.This paper makes a case study on the tunneling behavior of Zhuhai Zhongfu's lager shareholder CVC capital.First of all,it analyzes the tunneling means and motives of CVC capital.It is found that CVC Capital has a strong the nature of pursuing the interests,and its tunneling is to recover investment costs in advance and guarantee exit benefits.Secondly,from the perspective of financial performance and market performance,this paper analyzes the serious damage to Zhuhai zhongfu caused by the tunneling behavior of CVC Capital.Then,this paper analyzes the existing problems of internal and external governance environment of Zhuhai Zhongfu,which eventually led to the occurrence of CVC Capital's tunneling behavior.The problems mainly include the defects in the equity structure,the internal governance mechanism is not perfect,the asset assessment agency fails to maintain independence,and the legal violation costs are too low.At the end of the paper,the corresponding policy suggestions are put forward to prevent the tunneling of large shareholders and private equity investment.
Keywords/Search Tags:Tunneling, Lager Shareholder, Private Equity Investment
PDF Full Text Request
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