Research On The Optimal Mechanism And Implementation Of Supply Chain Procurement

Procurement is an important part of supply chain management.Both companies and government agencies are exposed to procurement.With the rapid development of the commodity economy,bidding and procurement have emerged,and along with the development of the market economy in our country has become more and more mature.Because the bidding method can make the purchaser obtain a better purchase price and choose a more efficient supply channel,more and more buyers tend to use the bidding method when ordering bulk commodities.The bidding can introduce competition among suppliers.The seller must provide the lowest price to win the supply opportunity,so it has the obvious advantage,which can significantly reduce the purchase cost and increase the profit.If the purchaser wants to minimize the purchase cost and increase their own revenue,how should the bidding mechanism be designed.In view of the above problems,this paper analyzes the supply chain bidding problems of a retailer(buyer)and multiple suppliers(sellers)when the marginal cost of suppliers is private information.Suppliers bid with wholesale prices,and the winner is the supplier with the lowest bid.And the optimal bidding mechanism for the retailer to maximize his expected revenue is obtained.Then two methods of actual bidding process are analyzed,and the relevant conclusions are drawn by comparing them with the optimal mechanism.If the retailer adopts first-price sealed auction,and adjusts the order quantity according to the wholesale price obtained through bidding,the optimal mechanism can be achieved.If the order quantity is fixed,then suppliers' biddings are higher,and the optimal mechanism cannot be achieved.If open-descending auction is adopted,the expected revenue of the retailer drops,and the probability of the procurement failure increases,the optimal mechanism cannot be achieved also.The principle of income equivalence is not valid.Finally,the relevant conclusions are verified by numerical examples.The research conclusions in this paper can provide some reference for Chinese enterprises in bidding and purchasing,so that the enterprises can have a basis for the design of bidding mechanism.