Pledge Of Controlling Shareholder's Equity And Accounting Conservatism

With the rapid development of China's stock market,the equity pledge has become one of the main financing methods for shareholders of listed companies in China.Each shareholder is concerned about how to maximize the amount of equity pledge financing,while each company and creditor is concerned about the impact of the holding shareholder's equity pledge on the listed company.The current research mainly focuses on the impact of controlling shareholder equity pledge on enterprise value,earnings management,enterprise innovation,etc.However,there is no research on the relationship between controlling shareholder equity pledge and accounting conservatism.Through the analysis of the stock pledge market,it is found that the financing channel of non-main board listed companies is narrower than that of listed companies on the main board,and it is more difficult to raise funds,so it is more dependent on the equity pledge financing method.In addition,the non-main board listed companies are more relaxed than the main board listed companies in the regulatory environment,their own qualifications are poor,and their ability to deal with risks is also weak.From this point of view,it has more academic value to study the impact of the equity pledge of controlling shareholders of non-main board listed companies on the accounting conservatism.Therefore,the research object of this paper is only non-main board listed company in China.Since the new three-board in the non-main board are not listed on the exchanges of Shanghai and Shenzhen,and the form of over-the-counter trading is adopted,the company's stocks have certain particularity and do not set up increases and decreases.Therefore,the stock market value obtained by the company according to the stock price estimation in the stock pledge is different from that of other non-main board.Therefore,the non-main board studied in this paper does not include the new three-board,but only the small and medium board and the growth board.Based on the data of non-main board listed companies from 2012 to 2016,this paper studies the influence of the pledge of controlling shareholders of non-main board listed companies on the accounting conservatism of the company and its reasons,and puts forward some pertinent suggestions based on the empirical results.This article is mainly divided into three major parts: The first part introduces the research background and related theoretical basis,the second part is the model design and the empirical results analysis,and the third part proposes the policy suggestions based on the research results.This paper first collects the relevant data of the controlling shareholder's equity pledge at the end of 2012-2016 in the non-main board listed companies,and selects a total of 1,263 non-main board listed companies that meet the research conditions of this article.Secondly,the accrual cash flow model is used to evaluate the accounting conservatism of non-main board listed companies,and a regression model is constructed.The relationship between the controlling shareholder's equity pledge and the accounting conservatism of listed companies is obtained through empirical analysis.This paper further compares the differences and similarities between the two groups of samples of state-owned and non-state listed companies,and finds out the reasons for the differences.Finally,this paper summarizes and points out the shortcomings of the paper,and puts forward the research prospects accordingly.It is found that the equity pledge of controlling shareholders of non-mainboard listed companies has the effect of reducing the accounting conservatism,but the degree of influence between them is obviously different in the property rights.