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Entry Threshold,Transaction Ordering And Manufacturers' Quality Selection Under The Monopoly Platform

Posted on:2019-01-12Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:M WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2359330545977718Subject:Industrial Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Platform enterprises maintained a momentum of rapid development since the existence of electric business platforms,China's e-commerce platform leads the world in development,but at the same time,the scale of platforms is growing,product quality issues have become pain points that the major platforms have never been able to cure.At present,the growth of e-commerce users in China has become saturated,and new competitors in the e-commerce sector have emerged.For platform companies,long-term development will inevitably require quality control to retain consumers.Unlike the traditional market,the two-way market does not make production decisions itself.Therefore,the efforts of the platform to ensure quality are not direct,but rely on its own monopoly power to impose vertical restrictions on the manufacturers to change the quality of the products on the market.It is based on sorting,recommendation or third-party marking and other means to influence consumer decision-making behavior and indirectly change the quality selection behavior of the manufacturer.Due to the existence of information asymmetry,the platform to set the sorting mechanism,the quality of the manufacturer's decision-making products,and the consumer's decision to purchase constitute a signal transmission process.This article elaborates the related theories and research results of the platform and the role of the platform,reviews the development of signal transmission theory,and establishes an analytical framework for consumer choice and vendor quality selection behavior based on this,first discussing the market results in the original state and finding competition.It will lead to a decline in the quality of products on the market,and then discuss the effect of directly setting the threshold,then analyze the three typical sorting mechanisms,and introduce the variable of consumer patience,comparing whether the quality selection behavior of the manufacturer is more primitive under different sorting mechanisms.The state of improvement is influenced by other factors.Finally,combined with the results of model analysis,a case study of a typical e-commerce platform in China was conducted.The main conclusions of this paper are summarized as follows:(1)Over-competition will always damage quality.Various sorting mechanisms are only improved in certain parts of the results and cannot completely solve this problem.Fine-tuning to avoid excessive competition may be more effective.(2)Consumer patience tends to have a positive effect on the sellers behind,and the platform should be managed with different strategies for products with different characteristics and corresponding patience.(3)Quality prioritization mechanism The results have been improved in different ways:a purely quality-first sorting mechanism is more conducive to manufacturers with high efficiency levels as a whole,and can accommodate more efficient manufacturers to choose to produce high-quality goods,but the role of inefficient suppliers is uncertain;Under the prioritized credit scoring mechanism,it can better avoid all manufacturers from choosing the worst case of lower quality,but it can not deterministically increase the range of all manufacturers to choose the high quality level;(4)The role of competitive ranking and third parties The tags have some similarities,when the price is set to be able to distinguish between the two manufacturers' scopes Within the market,the market can get better results,while the increased competition will still lead to a decline in the quality of products in the market.The main innovation of this paper is that it applies the signal transmission model to the framework of the manufacturer's quality selection behavior analysis and analyzes the results of different sorting mechanisms.The existing research on the online trading platform starts with information asymmetry,focusing on Concerned about how to design the mechanism to distinguish between good and bad sellers,and this article set the platform to identify product quality,and the platform has monopoly power to directly or indirectly interfere with the behavior of manufacturers;from the three perspectives of platform,manufacturers,and consumers,analyze competition The different solutions to the damage quality and their effects give different explanations and suggestions for the quality problems the platform faces.
Keywords/Search Tags:Monopoly Platform, Market Competition, Ranking Mechanism, Signal Transmission, Vendor Quality Selection
PDF Full Text Request
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