Information Disclosure Quality,Analyst Concern And Stock Price Synchronicity

The synchronism of stock price refers to the phenomenon that most stocks show the same rise and fall in a certain time,which is an important index to measure the efficiency of capital market.China’s capital market is still in the stage of emerging development,the synchronization of stock prices in the world for a long time in a high level,which also reflects the price of our securities market efficiency and inefficient allocation of resources,and to varying degrees,to the detriment of the interests of small and medium-sized investors.In addition,the listed company’s statements whitewash and insider trading phenomena such as repeatedly banned,some companies information disclosure of the true,accurate and complete difficult to protect,investors to information disclosure gradually lose confidence.With the continuous development and perfection of China’s securities market,the effective information plays an important role in guiding the stock price change,and the securities analyst,as the information intermediary of the capital market,has the ability to collect and interpret the information effectively,and to some extent,it can supervise the information disclosure of the listed companies.,so as to effectively reduce the synchronization of stock prices.Therefore,it is of great theoretical and practical significance to explore the effect of the quality of information disclosure on the synchronism of stock price and the interaction between the two.First of all,this paper reviews and combs the relevant literatures about the quality of information disclosure,the analyst’s concern and the stock price synchronization,and points out the emphases and deficiencies of the relevant research.Secondly,based on the theory of efficient market hypothesis,asymmetric information and noise transaction,this paper tries to analyze the quality of information disclosure,the conduction mechanism that analysts pay attention to the fluctuation of stock price,and then puts forward the concrete research hypothesis.Then,by constructing the empirical model,the paper empirically analyzes the effect of the quality of information disclosure on the synchronization of stock price,and on this basis,further explores the interaction between the quality of information disclosure and the synchronism of stock price.This paper chooses the data of China’s 2010-2016 SSE 866 listed companies,through the construction of empirical models,analyzes the quality of information disclosure,the impact of analyst concerns on stock price synchronization,and analysts ’ concern about the interaction between the quality of information disclosure and the synchronization of stock price.Further,in order to explore the heterogeneity of the above mechanism in different enterprises,different regions and different time intervals,the regression analysis of classified samples was carried out,and the robustness of the conclusions was tested.The results show that:(1)The quality of information disclosure is positively correlated with the synchronism of stock price,that is,the higher the quality of information disclosure of listed companies and the higher the synchronism of stock price,but the influence is mainly embodied in non-state-owned enterprises.(2)The analyst concern is negatively correlated with the stock price synchronization,that is,the higher the Analyst’s attention to the listed company,the lower the synchronism of the stock price,but the influence is mainly embodied in the Non-state-owned enterprises,the listed companies in the eastern region,and does not exist after 2014 years.(3)with the increase of the analyst’s concern,the improvement of the information disclosure quality of listed companies will effectively reduce the synchronism of stock price,but this kind of moderating effect is mainly embodied in the Non-state-owned enterprises and the listed companies in the eastern region,and it does not exist after 2014 years.Based on the conclusion,the paper puts forward the following policy suggestions:firstly,perfecting the information disclosure system of listed companies and improving the quality of information environment.Through establishing and perfecting the information disclosure system and incentive and restraint mechanism,strengthening the continuous supervision of information disclosure of listed companies,so as to enhance the information transparency of listed companies,ease the problem of asymmetric information and improve the operation efficiency of the securities market.Second,promote the healthy development of analyst industry,strengthen the role of external supervision of analysts.By standardizing and perfecting the development of the Securities analyst industry,the non professional investors can be encouraged to explore the intrinsic value of the company according to the effective information provided by the Securities analyst,and to play the role of the analyst in the external supervision of the listed company effectively.Third,foster the rational investment concept of investors,and strengthen the professional institutional investors team.Through perfecting the investor protection system,attaching importance to the protection of the small and medium investors,strengthening the rational investment idea of the investors,at the same time,expanding the professional institutional Investor team,giving full play to the supervision effect of the institutional investors on the listed companies.Finally,we should continuously reform the system of issuing and delisting to improve the quality of listed companies.Through reforming and perfecting the system of stock issuing and delisting,enhancing the inclusiveness and adaptability of the system,promoting the reform of registration system in a safe and orderly manner,enforcing the compulsory delisting of companies such as fraudulent issuance and financial fraud.