The Game And Empirical Analysis Of Supervision About Network Ordering Food Safety In China

With the popularity of network technology and human life rhythm speeding up,more and more businesses and consumers pay attention to the network ordering which is a new mode of meal,but this way has much trouble with hidden food safety.The approach to judge whether the food is safe or not for consumers is only images provided by the network ordering platform,and people always don't be conscious of protecting themselves from food safety problems.The government's supervision on food safety problems of the network ordering is still exploring,and effective supervision system has not been established.Chinese network ordering industry is still developing,and the network ordering platform aims at rapid expansion and more market,and business's goal is maximum profit.All these aggravate the food safety problems of the network ordering in our country.Therefore,to clear network ordering food safety regulatory issues and provide effective solutions in the basis of the present network ordering food safety supervising actuality,this article builds the game analysis and the empirical analysis of network ordering food safety supervision,which is significant to guarantee network ordering food safety in our country.This article is based on the analysis of the current situation of network ordering food safety and its regulation,and establish optimization model about network ordering platform and its food safety regulatory efforts to explore the influencing factors of network ordering platform regulatory efforts.And use game theory to analyze the related subject of network ordering food safety(business,network ordering platform,consumer and government departments)and their nature of interest relationship.Moreover,the structural equation modeling was built to analyze the relationship among the relevant subjects and their influencing factors through the data from questionnaire survey.Accordingly,it provides policy suggestions for Chinese network ordering food safety supervision.In this article,we analyze the current situation of the development of Chinese network ordering,and set up further optimization model to respectively analyze the relationship between network ordering platform scale and its food safety regulatory efforts at two different stages(the early stage and mature stage).It showed that at the early stage,the platform's first goal is to become bigger,but only when its scale is relatively small,the platform can have the optimal level of food safety regulatory efforts;In the mature stage,the ordering platform can determine the optimal scale,and the smaller the scale,the higher the level of the optimal food safety supervision.The game analysis to the related subject of network ordering food safety shows that if the network ordering platform's cost of supervision diminish,business tends to produce safe food.If the economic penalty because of business's unsafe food increases,the probability that business produce safe food will increase.The structural equation modeling of related main body and their role relationship analysis indicates that government and consumers have a direct positive influence to network ordering platform regulation,and they also have an indirect positive effect on business's production of safety food.At the same time,platform supervision has a direct positive effect on production of safety food and the effect is most obvious.The research on the supervision of network ordering food safety is mainly based on qualitative analysis,which lacks empirical analysis and theoretical model.Innovation of this article lies in using the game theory and optimization theory to analyze the behavior strategy of network ordering food safety related subject,and establishing structural equation modeling to empirically analyze the relationship between network ordering food safety related subject through the data from the investigation,which provides a strong argument for our country network ordering food safety regulation.