Government Subsidies,Technology Research And The Innovation Incentives Of New Energy Automotive Industry

To stimulate enterprise independent innovation through government subsidies is the main way for the government to support the development of new industries for a long time.But the existing research on this model can play a R & D incentive effect is still controversial,especially in the case of asymmetric information,government subsidies are frequently caused by "cheat fill" prominent,such as new energy vehicles,the recent exposure to cheat up events.Select the most representative development model of the emerging industry of new energy automotive industry,based on the historical evolution of the subsidy policy,according to the policy object and time characteristics in 2009 as the nodes in order to develop the subsidy "and" production subsidies in two stages.Through mathematical model analysis,the R & D performance is revised to make it closer to reality,and the effects of subsidy on Enterprise R & D under complete and incomplete information are reasoned and simulated.After that,the 88 companies of automobile manufacturing industry 2001-2015 years of data segmentation and classification of empirical treatment,using propensity score matching and linear regression method for evaluation of the implementation of the new energy automobile enterprise development the incentive effect of its policy,this thesis proves that the method above is very different with the existing research.The mathematical analysis results indicated that the new energy vehicles subsidy policy can play a role in encouraging enterprise development,but its development is the incentive of diminishing marginal utility,and when the subsidy intensity exceeds the critical value,the enterprise will completely lose the research motivation,and motivation of "cheat fill".The empirical results and measurement section,high strength "production subsidies" R & D incentive effect is far lower than the low intensity of "subsidy",and the sectional evaluation results of propensity score matching "counterfactual" was also supported this conclusion.According to the practical situation of new energy vehicles subsidy policy,this paper argues that the main reason causing the above mathematical and empirical results in high yield strength,subsidies and subsidies,light R & D compensation non punishment expenses handling mechanism,and the new energy automotive R & D the traditional financing channels and other factors,of which the first three the direct reason is obtained through mathematical analysis and measurement results,which is the core of the argument.And we draw conclusions about the incentive utility of subsidy policies for new energy vehicles,which are basically consistent with the conclusions drawn by most scholars in the field of industrial policy or other areas of subsidy policies.In summary,the main contribution of this paper is on the basis of further combing to the existing research on the new energy vehicles subsidy policy was distinguished,and the innovation incentive effect makes normative evaluation,so as to get a more precise conclusion.But the core inference of the full text thinks that the wrong use of the government innovation incentive way and the intensity of subsidies can not only achieve the desired results,but will disturb the normal market order,and lead to unnecessary social welfare losses.Therefore,with the results of the analysis,that the government should establish and perfect property protection system instead of false declaration of compensation mechanism for the punishment mechanism and improve the financial market,at the same time should be the new energy vehicles subsidy strength decreases gradually in the near future.To sum up,it is an important task for the future government to adjust the incentive policy of new energy vehicles.