| R&D investment is the key point in the process of enterprises’ growth and development,and R&D is also an important power to enhance the market competitiveness of enterprises.As the manager is the actual executor in the enterprises’ research and development investment,how to stimulate the manager to invest R&D is one of the important problems need to be solved of modern enterprise system.The differences on management incentives will affect the corporate governance effect,thus affecting the R&D efficiency of enterprises.However,on the one hand,executives are often out of the motive of risk aversion and reduce the company’s R&D investment,which damage the long-term interests of the company.On the other hand,research and development investment projects feature long construction period,huge investment,a large number of uncertainties and the difficult to assess,which lead to more serious agency problems between the company executives and shareholders.How to design a reasonable compensation mechanism is more and more important for enterprises,which could promote the efficiency of enterprise R&D investment.Based on china’s specific institutional environment and the disclosure status of R&D investment,this paper focus on the relationship between enterprise R&D investment and the executive compensation-performance sensitivity.The paper selects 2010-2014 years in shanghai and shenzhen a-share listed company,after a series of screening,the final sample is 6826 listed companies.This paper examines the research hypotheses by descriptive statistics?Pearson correlation analysis and further validates the hypotheses by OLS regressions.In addition,considering the enterprise ownership structure affects corporate behaviour,the paper groups the samples according to the nature and ownership concentration of equity,the main conclusions are drawn as follows:(1)There is a positive correlation between R&D investment and executive compensation-performance sensitivity.As performance-based compensation mechanism could reduce agency cost between shareholders and executives,when the enterprise invest R&D,the relation between executive compensation and corporate performance will increase.(2)Further analysis shows that in state-owned enterprises or companies with decentralized equity,the agency problem is more serious.To alleviate the agency problem,these companies are more likely to link executive compensation and corporate performance.Finally,this paper presents research advice based on the conclusions.Enterprises in the design of executive R&D investment activities’ compensation contract need to distinguish the differences between R&D investment and conventional financial business,and can bear early failure in R&D investment and reward their final or longterm success.At the same time,considering the high uncertainty and long period,the agency problems also should be taken into consideration,for the state-owned enterprises and the relatively dispersed equity enterprises,the establishment of a reasonable compensation mechanism can significantly improve the efficiency of R&D investment. |
