Research On Corporate Governance,manager's Overconfidence And Accounting Information Quality From The Perspective Of Property Right

The quality of accounting information is closely related to the interests of shareholders and senior management.The accounting information of the enterprise is the direct basis for the investors to understand the production and operation of the enterprise and make the final investment decision.It is the reference content of the senior management personnel,too.The quality of the enterprise directly determines the success or failure of the decision.Academics for the impact of corporate accounting information quality factors and how to improve the quality of accounting information launched a wide range of research.However,it is regrettable that much research on the impact of accounting information quality of the literature,but rarely introduce managers overconfident factors and further discussion of corporate governance and managers overconfidence on the overall impact of accounting information quality.Based on the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2015,this paper divides corporate governance,manager's overconfidence and enterprise accounting information into a unified framework system.And examines how corporate governance and managers' self-confidence in different property rights,to impact the independent role of corporate accounting information quality and the common impact.On the basis of previous studies,this paper uses the principal component analysis method,and use the corporate governance level of listed companies(the size of the board of directors,the proportion of independent directors,the size of the board of supervisors,the top three executives,the top three directors,Shareholding ratio,the largest shareholder of the proportion of square sum,the top three shareholders holding the sum of the proportion,the top five shareholders holding the proportion of the square sum,the top ten shareholders holding the proportion of square,the proportion of the first shareholders and the proportion of the proportion of the second largest shareholder,the ratio of state-owned shares)the 12 aspects of the corporate governance composite index to reflect the level of corporate governance.Profit forecast deviation(deviation rate =(forecast profit-actual profit)/ actual profit)(used in regression analysis)and the manager's relative pay level(used in robustness test)is used to reflect the level of the degree of overconfidence of the manager.With the surplus quality as the substitute index,the residual value of DD model is used to measure the quality of enterprise accounting information,considered the relationship between corporate governance,manager's overconfidence and accounting information quality comprehensively.In this paper,the software Eviews6.0 and SPSS19.0 are used to analyze the descriptive statistics.And Analysis of descriptive statistics,correlation analysis,and multiple linear regression of major variables are used.The empirical results show that: The higher the level of corporate governance is,the better the quality of corporate accounting information is,that is,corporate governance can help improve the quality of corporate accounting information.Non-state holdings of corporate governance level to corporate accounting information is more significant;excessive self-confidence management is necessary to carry out the manipulation of surplus,so as to reduce the quality of accounting information,and the influence of the self-confidence of state-owned holding enterprises on the quality of accounting information is more significant.Finally,corporate governance helps to prevent managers from overconfident Accounting information quality of the negative impact,while in non-state holding enterprises,the corporate governance of the inhibitory effect is more significant.To this end,this paper puts forward the corresponding policy recommendations,including the construction of a reasonable ownership structure,improving the board of directors,the supervisory board of supervisors effectiveness,improving the executive compensation incentive mechanism.They conducive to investors for making objective judgments and correct investment decisions to improve the effectiveness of decision-making;conducive to improving the board of directors and supervisory board supervision mechanism,and thus promoting the healthy development of the company itself;but also help to optimize the allocation of market resources,China's sustainable development of the securities market,and ultimately better for the company shareholders,creditors and other relevant stakeholders.