Shareholder Supervision,Executive Turnover And Compensation Changes

With the development of securities market in China,various systems have been revised and improved constantly,and the salaries of executives has been disclosed in the annual report.Because the salaries of executives is related closely with the distributional equity of social income and the corruption of the executives,there it has attracted much attention.In recent years,there are many reports on the ranking of executive salaries,which have also caused a number of comments.In the academic circles,the issue about the rationality of executive salaries is also favored by many scholars.Many domestic and foreign literature discussed the status and problems of executive salaries,from different angles,different ways and different data,but the conclusions are not identical.The thesis conducts an empirical research on the fluctuation of executive pay from shareholder supervise,key executive and executive change based on referring to the current conferences.With the executives’ salaries disclosed in the annual report of listed companies in 2013-2015 as a sample,the amount of changes in executive salaries is obtained after treatment.Compared with the previous literature,the data used in this paper to measures the changes of executive salaries is more comparable,and,and all the executives whose salaries are disclosed in the annual report are included in this paper,so it is extensive.In the fourth chapter,the data collection and processing are described in detail.The thesis takes the fluctuation of executive pay(ΔPay)as explained variable and management power(Power),shareholder supervise(Supervise),key executive(Key)and executive change(Change)as main explanatory variable and adds duty(Duty)and industry(Industry)as control variable.it uses seven dimensions including the size of management to measure management power and four dimensions including separating extent of ownership and controlling right to measure shareholder supervise.It proves that good shareholder supervise can restrain the rise of executive pay and further proves that shareholder supervise can restrain the executives’ selfish behaviors because too large management power.The thesis studies that whether the controlling shareholder will increase the key executives’ corporate performance relationship and reduce the agent cost by encouragement based on shareholder supervise.It turns out that the key executives’ salary-performance sensitivity is higher than non-key executives’.Finally,shareholders prefer to making a relatively low remuneration contracts to the new executives after verifying the change of executives.And then,the result does not change after conducting a stable test on the used models.Finally,making a summary for the thesis’ s assumption and conclusion,illustrating the problems and limitations in the thesis and proposing my views for the direction of the future research.