Mixed Reform Of State-Owned Enterprises And Corporate Cash Holdings

The financing constraint and agency problem under the information asymmetry are the key factors influencing the cash holdings,which also been the mystery of cash holdings because of the higher and lower value view.Previous research assumes there a constant equity structure,However,which ignored the dynamic adjustment of shareholding structure when shareholders in or out.In particular,the frequent introduction of a series of policies and documents recently,with the active development of the state-owned capital,collective capital,non-public capital and the deepening reform of other cross-shareholding,integration of mixed ownership reform(MOR).But the existing studies have neglected the change of cash holdings in the process of the state-owned enterprises’(SOEs)mixed ownership.So,this paper based on the balanced panel data of A-share listed SOEs from 2003 to 2015,focused on the effect of SOEs’ MOR on the cash holdings,impact mechanism and its economic consequences.Main conclusions as follows,(1)the relationship between ownership diversity(OD,the types of shareholders from top10)and cash holdings is not obvious,but the degree of equity dispersion(ED)and equity integration(EI)is positively related to the cash holdings(especially in the competitive industries(CI)and high-market processes(HMP)),the relationship in the transfer of control(TOC)is also not significant(but a negative correlation in CI and HMP);(2)The results of the mechanism inspection found that,its not the financing of the restricted work,but the governance effect results in,which ED and EI through reducing the over-investments med by excess cash(especially in CI and HMP)and increasing R&D,while TOC can both inhibits the over-investment(Stronger in CI and HMP),increasing R&D and dividends,which lead to cash holdings not changed;(4)The results of the economic consequences show that,the OD,ED and EI have a limited influence on the competitive effect of cash holdings,the OD does not promote the value of the cash,that promotion in ED is limited,while the role of EI and TOC is more obvious(especially in CI and HMP).The possible theoretical contribution and practical implication:(1)Based on the dynamic change of SOEs’ property rights and ownership structure in China’s institutional,this paper explores its possible impact on cash holdings behavior,which also enriches the existing research on cash holdings;(2)The theoretical research on the MOR is obviously lagging behind the reform practice,Especially which is different from the general privatization,there is diversified controversy over the economic consequences of reform.The article attempts to through the cash holdings to evaluate China’s current MOR is effectively enhanced the value of the company,and to reveal the reasons for the existing differences in MOR,too.Which can also provide some empirical evidence for the comprehensive evaluation in the economic consequences of MOR,and some policy suggestions or experience for the future of MOR.