Research On Executive Equity Incentive And Self-interest Behavior Of Heng Shun Zhong Sheng Company

The separation of ownership and management of the situation,business owners and operators to pursue their different interests,operators are likely to use enterprise resources to maximize their own interests and sacrifice the interests of owners,the two are often in conflict state.Equity incentive will be linked to the efforts of managers and compensation,so that the interests of managers and owners tend to be consistent,and thus achieve the purpose of maximizing the interests of shareholders.A large number of studies have shown that equity incentive can effectively stimulate the operator,the company's performance,value has played a significant role in improving.In practice,as a kind of good coordination mechanism between the interests of the operators and the owners,the equity incentive mechanism has been successfully implemented and promoted rapidly in the western countries since its birth.China's listed companies equity incentive mechanism construction process is relatively slow,until in January 1,2006?The Equity Incentive Management of Listed Companies(Trial)?formally implemented,it marks the equity incentive in Listed Companies in China has entered a practical stage.This paper reviews the previous literature on equity incentive and executive self interested behavior.Then based on the principal-agent theory,combined with China's small and medium-sized investment protection legal system,information disclosure system and supervision system background,through exploring the rise of Hengshun equity incentive plan issued that there are problems in the process,a detailed analysis of the self-interest behavior of executives in the equity incentive under the United Nations Database in Tai'an the data of the listed companies and the relevant data of the wind database,the executives self-interest behavior consequences,also a detailed explanation of the executives can through a variety of means to seek personal gain,for example,set the unlocked condition lower,stock holdings etc.can make themselves have equity incentive more value.The innovation of this paper is that leveraged financing as an important means of rapid financing,for the first time in the behavior of executives crazy stock holdings.Through the analysis of the case,we explain the great risk of executives to drive up the stock price,but also explain why the securities firms will agree to give them a high leverage financing.Finally,in order to solve these problems,this paper puts forward some policy suggestions in order to provide some reference for future research in this field.