The Financial Fraud Of Company H From The Perspective Of Game Theory Problem Study

With the rapid development of global capital markets and the formation of economic integration,corporate stakeholders are increasingly credible to the financial statements.The financial fraud of listed companies not only damages the interests of equity investors and creditors,but also affects the degree of mutual trust,which increases the additional social cost and affects the healthy development of China's capital market and the stability of the economy.Many scholars have made deep research on the motivations,ways and harms of corporate financial fraud,and have also studied the problem with game theory,but few have applied game theory to practical case study.Therefore,this article chooses the game theory as the angle of view,carries on the thorough analysis to the H company financial fraud case,puts forward some fraud prevention measures based on the case analysis result,and to promote the healthy development of China's securities market.In this paper,the literature research and case analysis of the combination of the selected topics to study.First of all,the theory of fraud and game theory are described,illustrates the use of game theory to analyze the feasibility of financial fraud,for the subsequent case analysis to pave the way to provide theoretical support.Then,the author introduces the financial fraud case of Company H,and extracts the fundamental factors that affect the expected utility of each game around the background of the case.According to the fundamental factors,the two-game matrix model is established,and the expected utility function of each game subject is listed.The results of the analysis show that:(1)the probability of corporate fraud is inversely proportional to the efficiency of regulatory supervision and punishment and the business situation,and is proportional to fraud revenue.(2)The probability of noncompliance of intermediaries is proportional to the additional proceeds from the violation,which is inversely proportional to the probability of corporate fraud,the cost of punishment,and the regulatory efficiency.(3)The high-quality regulatory probability of the regulator is proportional to the cost of punishment,the efficiency of media supervision,and the cost of the failure of the regulatory agency to be inversely proportional to the cost of supervision.Finally,through the establishment of the game tree model from the overall level of the case of the game analysis,analysis shows that the key step to prevent corporate fraud lies in the regulatory body of the strategic choice,the behavior of regulators will affect the intermediaries and corporate strategy options.According to the results of the game analysis,the financial fraud prevention measures should proceed from the three aspects of the enterprises themselves,the intermediaries and the supervisors.The suggestions are as follows: 1,perfect the independent director system;2,strengthen the functions of the board of supervisors;3,strengthen the supervision of internal audit 7,to optimize the audit appointment system;8,to improve the penalties for violations;9,to strengthen the guiding model function;10,to promote the audit system;5,to strengthen professional services;6,to promote inter-bank mutual investigation system;Party evidence system;11,attention to media information.