The Study On The Effect Of Executive Characteristics Of Listed Family Enterprises On The Investment Efficiency

As the backbone of China's private enterprises,family enterprises gradually develop in the tide of history,and they are considered powerful engines for the rapid development of China's economy,which can not be ignored.Nowadays,with everything changing dramatically,it has been a hot topic for the research on family enterprise governance that whether the traditional "paternalistic" governance pattern can keep family enterprises energetic constantly or not.The investment decision is one of the important strategic decisions of enterprises,which will affect the efficiency of resource distribution.The research on investment efficiency is particularly important,especially in China,where economic growth is mainly driven by the investment.There is no doubt that the executives who are the makers and executors of corporate development strategy will have an significant impact on the investment conditions of the enterprises.For a long time,in the traditional family culture,it is common for family enterprises to employ executives who are members of the family.Now,with the development of professional manager market,there are managers both from the families and markets,when the age of inner-family business has come.Managers from the families and the markets have different effects on the corporate governance because of the difference in their genetic characteristics.The agency cost,to a certain extent,which is considered as a conveyor belt,will greatly influence corporate investment decisions,and finally the long-term development of family enterprises.Therefore,it has important theoretical and practical significance to study the effect of genetic characteristics of executives of Chinese family enterprises on the efficiency of the investment.At present,due to the rise of professional manager market,a considerable part of the family enterprises hired professional managers as corporate executives,which provides sample support and data sources for the relevant research.This paper chooses the listed family enterprises in the main board of China as the research sample,and empirically analyzes the data from 2012 to 2014.On the basis of previous researches,according to the different characteristics of relationship between senior executives and owners,this paper uses the improved Hamilton relationship coefficient(Hamilton,1964)from the evolutionary biology,to quantify the genetic characteristics.And then an empirical analysis of the impact of genetic characteristics of executives of Chinese family enterprises on the agency cost and the efficiency of the investment is conducted.The study indicates that the characteristics of the relationship between executives will have an significant impact on the agency cost and the investment efficiency of enterprises.The results show that:(1)the agency cost between the family enterprises' owners--managers and inefficient investment are positively related;(2)the genetic characteristics of executives is positively related with the inefficiency investment,it intensifies the inefficiency investment caused by agency problems between owners and managers.Finally the paper puts forward suggestions to optimize the internal governance structure of family enterprises and investment behavior,to hope to provide experience and reference for the governance and inheritance of Chinese family enterprises in the succession age.