Study On Central-local Allocation Of Taxation Right Of The Environmental Protection Tax

Faced with serious problems of environmental pollution, such as haze, water pollution,etc., people are full of expectation for normalization of "APEC blue" and "parade blue".Similar to anti-corruption, social equity, social security, income distribution and other topics,environnmental governance is also one of people's top concerns.In order to improve the environmental condition and accelerate transformation of the mode of economic development, China has introduced a series of environmental protection policies in recent years, in which environmental protection tax is a policy for envronment and economy which has attracted much social attention. Environmental protection tax can play a role of adjustment, Establishing and perfecting the environnmental protection tax not only helps definitize the responsibility of environmental protection of individuals, enterprises and the governnment, but also can maximally reduce man-made environmental damage, promote transformation and upgrading, of industrial structure and improve ecological environment.Thus. researches on environmental protection tax has both theoretical and practical significances and deserves to be valued by the circles of environmental protection, taxation,etc..China's Environmental Protection Tax Law was legislated in 2016. but it contains no explicit provisions about the ownership of environmental protection tax and use of tax revenue. Currently, no other laws have provided such provisions. Therefore, interest games exist in central and local governments' fight for taxation right of the environmental tax in future, especially in allocation of rights of tax collection and management and profit distribution. On the basis of existing policies and scientific data. this thesis analyzes the allocation of taxation right of the environmental protection tax to central and local governments, uses a game model as an analysis tool to theoretically demonstrate the ownership of the environmental protection tax, and leads to the conclusion: the author considers that on the premise of not violating superior legislation, the central government should delegate part of the legislative power for the environmental protection tax to local governments: environnmental protection tax is more suitable to be taken as local tax. collected and managed by local governments, and the right of collecting and managing environmental protection tax should be completely delegated to local governments; the policy of levying pollution discharge fees should be continued; the revenue of environmental protection tax should be used for a specific purpose and local governments should execute the power of allocating revenue of environmental protection tax. It will help harmonize the interest relationship between central and local governments, avoid malignant competition and achieve a win-win situation. The thesis applies the method of document analysis and combination of hypothesis and inference to analysis of game relationship between central and local governments in allocation of taxation right of the environmental protection tax. in the hope of facilitating perfection of China's environmental protection tax system and preparation of tax collection and management, and providing beneficial help to future extension and reform of environmental protection tax.