Research On Managerial Incentive,Risk Taking And The Efficiency Of Capital Allocation In Listed Companies

In recent years,the scarcity of resources has lead to the capital allocation become the core issue of financial management research.Management team as the key to the development of the company,their investment policy has a crucial impact on the future direction of the company and the management incentive in corporate governance become an important part.In order to make the management to overcome the tendency of risk aversion to select high risk and expand the value of the company,management incentives naturally become an important part of corporate governance.How to design a reasonable incentive system,it has became more significance to improve the corporate governance mechanism and the level of risk taking.It always help to overcome the risk aversion of management to improve the efficiency of capital allocation and to promote the long-term development of the company.This thesis firstly reviews and summarizes the literature of domestic and foreign research.Then on the base of the analysis of relevant concepts and theories,the thesis analyzes the interaction mechanism between the three and puts forward the corresponding hypotheses.This thesis uses the management compensation of the top three,the total shareholding of management value and management expenses for the eight respectively measure management compensation,management equity incentive and management of on-the-job consumption.This thesis uses annualized rate of return by the standard deviation to measure of firm risk taking and uses data envelopment super efficiency DEA to measure the efficiency of capital allocation.Then the thesis uses Stata14.0 software and the panel data among the 763 listed companies in the period of 2010-2015 years systematically and comprehensively to test of the relationship and analyse the mechanism of action among managerial incentives,risk-taking and the efficiency of capital allocation.The conclusions are as follows: Management compensation incentive and on-the-job consumption are helpful to increase corporate risk taking and to improve the efficiency of capital allocation;Risk taking plays an intermediary role between management compensation incentive and the efficiency of capital allocation,the same is also between managerial on-the-job consumption and the efficiency of capital allocation;Management equity incentive can't significantly improve the company's the efficiency of capital allocation and risk taking is not the intermediary variable between the management equity incentive and the efficiency of capital allocation,but the management of the shareholding will help enhance the corporate risk taking.Finally,according to the conclusions of the thesis to point out the lack of research and put forward some suggestions.The conclusion of this thesis deepens the understanding of the relationship between management,risk taking and the efficiency of capital allocation and enriches the understanding of the positive role of risk taking.This thesis provides an effective reference for the listed companies in China to introduce the risk factors in the design of management incentive programs and provides the basis for the effective investment behavior of the regulators.