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Game Analysis Of Online Price Fraud

Posted on:2018-01-02Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Z H HeFull Text:PDF
GTID:2359330515987739Subject:National Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
This paper firstly sorts out and summarizes the literature review of economic analysis of price fraud,and then introduces the connotation,manifestation and common cases of price fraud.Then the paper introduces the development of game theory,the related elements of game theory and the relevant game model of online price fraud phenomenon,which lays a foundation for the analysis of online price fraud phenomenon.On this basis,the paper constructs the game model among the network operators,the network sales platform,the government price supervisory department and the consumers,and they are the participants of the online price fraud behavior.Besides,the author obtains the corresponding payment matrix.In the game between the network operators,the result is that the two sides will conduct price fraud to each other theoretically.In the empirical literature,the network operators often carry out price fraud by means of no basis for false original price and bid price.In the game between the network sales platform operator and the government,the result is that whether the network operator conducts price fraud behavior is related to the amount of extra revenue of conducting price fraud and the punishment intensity of the price supervision department.In the empirical literature,due to the reason that the punishment intensity of the government is relatively small,the earnings of network operators are relatively large in the single game between the network operators and the government,so the network operators choose price fraud.In the game between the consumer and the network operator,there are two situations for discussion.The first case is the game between the consumer and the network operator before the network transaction.The consumer will be deceived due to the amount of fraud costs invested by the network operator and "voluntarily" jump into the network operator’s price trap.And the occurrence rate of price fraud behavior changes according to the punishment costs that network operators may face.The second case is that when the consumer suffers price fraud,the consumer’s behavior will be affected by appraisal cost,bargaining cost and the amount of indemnification.And the network operator’s behavior will be affected by the punishment intensity of the network sales platform and the price supervisory department.In the empirical literature,the current cost of right maintenance is too high and the amount of compensation is small.The consumers lack legal regulation knowledge of price fraud behavior and have less complaint channels and tedious complaints procedures.Due to these factors,the consumers choose to give up the right to complain and report,and network operators continue to take price fraud as an optimal strategy because of the hidden aegis of the network sales platform and the weak law enforcement of the price supervisory department.In the game between the network sales platform and the government,whether the network sales platform conducts reform is related to the tax reduction and tax-exemptpolicies,punishment intensity and the reformed revenue.In the empirical literature,China does not have preferential tax policies to support the reform,and the reformed revenue of the network sales platform is uncertain;there is no strong and powerful punishment intensity and reform impetus of the network sales platform.In the empirical literature,the network sales platform not only wants to reform the price marking mechanism and creates a trustworthy business environment,but also wants to retain the network operators and maintain the total volume of network consumption.The network sales platform is in a dilemma.Finally,combined with the conclusion of the above model,the paper argues that the government should speed up the establishment of social credit system,temper justice with mercy,improve and redefine the punishment standard;increase the cost of supervision in the short term,reduce and maintain stable regulatory costs in the long term;formulate law-abiding incentive mechanism of online sales platforms,encourage online consumption platforms to reform through tax abatement and tax-exempt policies,increase the amount of indemnification for consumers who suffer price fraud,rectify the price fraud behavior within the platform;regulate the behavior of government regulators,speed up the establishment of legal system,provide a good legal environment;recommend network consumers to strengthen the prevention awareness of price fraud and correctly guide the professional informers.
Keywords/Search Tags:online price fraud behavior, information asymmetry, mixed strategy game
PDF Full Text Request
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