Research On The Behavior Of Platform Under The Internet Of Things Based On Twosided Matching Theory

The appearance of Internet of Things and Cloud Manufacturing has caused worldwide concern for manufacturing information revolution.The uncertainty and diversity of market demands claim higher requirements for enterprises' manufacturing and operational capabilities.Thanks to the emergence of Cloud Manufacturing,it is possible for firms to integrate available manufacturing resources to meet the changing needs.Enterprises can interconnect the intelligent facilities distributed in different geographical regions and control the state of intelligent resources at any time.Under the condition of cloud manufacturing,companies with remaining available capacity can choose to sell them and become the supply side;at the same time,companies short of available capacity want to complete production through consumption,so they become the demand side.Thus a two-sided matching market for trading available capacity is formed and the platform providing resources' searching and matching services appears.It has important practical and theoretical meaning for the stability of cloud manufacturing market and the improvement of social welfare to study the structure and features of this two-sided market,design a stable matching mechanism and choose reasonable pricing strategy for the platform.Based on the analysis of Cloud Manufacturing background and the lack of existing research,this paper studies the behavior of the cloud manufacturing platform,including the two-sided stable matching mechanism and the pricing strategy,using stable matching theory,market design theory,game theory and other methods.Firstly,the structure and features of the cloud manufacturing market are analyzed,a two-sided market model of available manufacturing resources led by cloud platform is established.Then we design a two-sided matching mechanism based on the preferences of each side and prove the existence of the stable matching results.Finally,we verify the feasibility of the mechanism through an example.After that,we consider a two-stage game which is led by the platform,followed by the manufacturing resources provider who has fairness preference.The pricing strategies and utilities of cloud manufacturing platform whether the manufacturing resources provider has the fairness preference or not is discussed separately and analyzed comparatively.The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:(1)There always exists a stable matching result in the two-sided market trading available manufacturing resources;(2)For a two-sided market given preferences,there may exists more than one stable matching results,and we can find the most satisfactory result for each side;(3)Regardless of the fairness preference,the price of platform is related to the crossnetwork externality factor and the scales of both sides.When users are in a small scale,platform can set a low price to attract users;when users are in a large quantity,platform can get higher returns by increasing price;(4)When the manufacturing resources provider has fairness preference,the price and utility of the platform are lower depending on the degree of the fairness preference.