Cash Distribution,Internal Control And M&A Performanc

The inconsistency between the parent company and the subsidiary company in the enterprise group and the inconsistency of the two sides' business objectives will usually lead to agency conflicts between the parent and the subsidiary.Cash as a financial resource can easily be rented by an agent through acquisitions.Whether the parent company's capital control over the subsidiary is too centralized or flexible,will reduce the organizational efficiency of the enterprise.Therefore,it is of great practical significance to study whether the frequent M&A caused by the allocation of cash to the subsidiaries can produce good parent company M&A performance.The results show that the higher the cash distribution of subsidiaries,the lower the performance of the parent company.Effective internal control has a significant weakening effect on the low M&A performance of the high cash distribution of subsidiaries.In addition,the study found that the business model of enterprise group is different,and the cash distribution has different influence on M&A performance.Moreover,in the subsidiary business model,the cash distribution level of the subsidiary has a significant negative impact on the long-term M&A performance of the parent company,which has no significant effect on the short-term M&A performance of the parent company.In the parent company business model,the cash distribution level of the subsidiary has a significant negative impact on the short-term M&A performance of the parent company,which has no significant effect on the long-term M&A performance.The conclusion of the study will help to further explore the "black box" operation mechanism of the efficiency loss of the enterprise group,which will help to construct and develop the internal capital market of the enterprise group.