Executive Control Rights,Internal Control Andcorporateperformance

To learn lessons from Enron,in recent years,more and more researchers engage in internal control field,and hope to monitor the listed company's behavior with a serious of well-established internal control regulations.However,after so many years,researches still mainly focus on the relationship between business performance and internal control system,and less focus on other urgent problems.Such as,whether the ownership belongs to government or not have a significant influence on the internal control system,how the power of executives affect the efficiency of internal control system,whether the performance of listed company will be affected by the limitation of executives' power and effectiveness of internal control.In China,the capital market is not perfect.Since the economic environment and related systems are not yet sound,it is still required that the government,the relevant regulators and related departments should carry out macro-economic control on enterprises.For the senior managers of state holding listed companies appointed and assigned by the government,although they have just slightly bigger competitive advantages than other senior executives in terms of professional skills and knowledge,they are able to bring more significant competitive advantages for the state holding listed companies through the interpersonal network and abundant resources as well as background.Based on this,state holding listed companies can get more support in term of the financing channels,technology acquisition,market expansion and so on by its background and resources.In addition,the five-thousand-year historic culture unconsciously strengthens the decadent ideology of absolute monarchy and supreme class,which virtually causes the phenomena of over-expansion of some senior managers' power and deciding everything by one man's say at China's listed companies to prevail but actually they should not arise.Looking back at what have been done by China's listed companies in terms of the disclosure of internal control information in recent years,it is not difficult to find that the index of internal control is increasingly rising,but there are still many problems on internal control worth thinking about.For listed companies,does the personal right of senior managers have been impacted on the company's internal control? What impacts will be? Then what kind of conduction effect does it on the performance of companies? Are the impacts the same under different natures of property right? This thesis is based on the above questions,combined with appropriate data as well as relevant experience and models,and conducts systematic and objective analysis and testing on the above problems.To solve the problems mentioned above,this paper choose Shanghai A-Stock listed companies as sample pool,to study the relationship between executive authority,internal control,and company performance in state-owned listed company and private listed company.The conclusion reveals the fact that the well-established internal control could improve the performance remarkably.The centrality of executives' power has no significant relationship with performance.In state-owned listed company,the over-centralized executive power always result in a negative effect on internal control,and lower the performance.Executives with few shares in state-owned listed company will have a positive effect on internal control,but not significant.In private listed company,the over-centralized executive power always result in a positive effect on internal control,but restrain the raising function which internal control could affected on performance.