Research On The Effect Of Executive Incentives On Cost Stickiness In Manufacturing Listed Companies

Cost management is an important part of the management process in the process of enterprise management,and it is also a hot topic recently discussed by academics and theorists.China's manufacturing industry depends on the cost advantage to survive and develop,the cost advantage is the greatest competitiveness of the manufacturing sector.Therefore,the cost management for the manufacturing industry is of particular significance,is the manufacturing industry in the market competition in an invincible position of the necessary initiatives.The traditional cost behavior in management accounting assumes that the cost change is due to changes in the volume of business,the cost changes with the amount of business changes,and increase or decrease is relatively symmetrical,that the cost will increase with the business or Reduced changes in the same magnitude.However,this is only an idealized description,is based on the assumption of the ideal environment,domestic and foreign scholars through the in-depth study of the cost and found that changes in costs and business volume is a non-linear relationship,the cost of business The magnitude of the increase in the amount of increase will be greater than the volume decreased when the volume decreases,this asymmetry change is called the cost of sticky.Principal-agent theory holds that the implementation of appropriate incentives can alleviate the conflict of agents and promote the consistency of the interests of senior executives and shareholders,help to reduce the behavior of executives,so that executives can make cost decisions from the perspective of long-term development of enterprises The difference in the degree of incentive leads directly to the difference in incentive effects,which has a significant impact on the cost management of executives.Based on the theory of principal-agent,incomplete contract theory and efficiency,this paper systematically analyzes the influence of executive incentive on cost stickiness by means of normative and empirical methods.This paper chooses China's manufacturing industry as sample data,analyzes the existence of cost stickiness and the effect of executive incentive on cost stickiness.This paper is divided into five parts:the first part of the introduction,mainly elaborated the reality of this study background and theory,practical significance,systematically combed the status quo at home and abroad,describes the main research ideas,research methods and possible The existence of innovation.The second part elaborates the related concepts and theoretical basis of the influence of the executive incentive of the listed companies on the cost sticky.First,the concept of executive,executive incentive and cost sticky is defined,followed by the introduction of manufacturing listed companies The theoretical basis of the influence of executive incentive on cost stickiness.The theory of this paper mainly includes principal-agent theory,incomplete contract theory and efficiency theory.The third part focuses on the current situation of the cost of manufacturing listed companies,the incentive and the incentive of the stock,and discusses the mechanism of the incentive effect of the executive incentive on the cost of stickiness and puts forward the hypothesis of this paper.The fourth part is the empirical research part of this paper.This paper chooses the listed companies of China's manufacturing industry as a research sample from 2013 to 2015,and validates the influence of executive compensation incentive and equity incentive on cost stickiness.The fifth part is the conclusion,the policy.suggestion,the insufficiency and the prospect of the research.The empirical conclusion of this paper is that there is a significant negative correlation between the executive compensation incentive and the cost stickiness of the listed companies,that is,the short-term monetary salary incentive can reduce the cost;Long-term equity incentive and long-term equity incentive can significantly increase the cost of stickiness;according to the nature of property rights group,compared to non-state-owned enterprises,state-owned enterprise executives incentive to greater impact on the cost of sticky,While the effect of executive equity incentive on cost stickiness is not significant.Furthermore,according to the above part of the empirical analysis of the formation of research conclusions,and then put forward some possible policy recommendations,and analysis of the shortcomings of this study,made a further study of the future.The possible innovation of this paper is in the research perspective and research content.From the perspective of research,the existing literature on the study of cost stickiness mostly focuses on the study of the existence and influencing factors of cost stickiness.On the basis of domestic and foreign research,this paper chooses the research perspective of executive incentive,Cost of sticky effects.In this paper,we study the nature of the sample property,and deeply study the effect of executive incentive on cost stickiness under different property rights.