Research On The Impact Of Executive Option Compensation On The Dynamic Regulation Of Capital Structure Based On Agency Problem

Since the birth of modern enterprises,the issue of principal-agent has been the core of discussion in corporate governance theory.Improving the interests of the owner and the agent is not the same problem to solve the problem of principal-agent problem,so equity incentive has always been regarded as an effective tool to solve the problem of principal-agent.In the equity incentive plan,most companies choose the stock option incentive mode,which makes the interests of the owner and the agent of the convergence between the objectives,so that operators really from the enterprise development and shareholder interests from the point of view to work hard.It can promote the management to adjust the corporate capital structure in order to achieve the goal of maximizing the value of the enterprise;but the managers of the use of their authority to seek personal gain is not uncommon and makes people doubt the incentive effect.This paper combines the two aspects of stock option incentive and dynamic adjustment of capital structure,and deeply discusses the relationship between the two and the adjustment of the two factors,so as to provide some theoretical support for the practice of stock option incentive in China.This paper first elaborates the research background and the research significance of the stock option incentive and the capital structure theory,and reviews the related research conclusion in the past;Secondly,it defines the connotation of stock option incentive and capital structure,and elaborates the theory of option value,trade-off theory and principal-agent theory applied in this paper;Thirdly,based on the literature and theory review,this paper puts forward the hypothesis of this paper,and examines the impact of the implementation of stock option incentive on the speed of capitalstructure adjustment;Finally,the conclusion of this paper is analyzed and five suggestions based on practical level are put forward.The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: First,the implementation of the stock option incentive improves the cost of adjusting the capital structure,increases the difficulty of adjusting the capital structure,increasing the actual capital structure and the distance between the target capital structure.Second,when the shareholding is more decentralized,the effect of the option incentive on the rate of adjustment of the capital structure is weakened,and when the equity is more concentrated,it will enhance the negative impact.Thirdly,when the general manager and the chairman of the board are one person,the negative effect of the incentive rate on the adjustment of the capital structure will be strengthened.When the general manager and the chairman of the board are two different person,the degree of the incentive to adjust the speed of the capital structure weakened.Fourth,the enterprise scale,growth,profitability,asset guarantee value and the book market value ratio will have an impact on the enterprise's capital structure adjustment behavior,and the impact of the effect of a certain degree of robustness.In short,the results of this paper show that the implementation of stock option incentive to capital structure adjustment gradually emerged,but in the implementation process is still inevitable there are some problems.By improving the capital market environment,standardizing information disclosure and enhancing internal supervision,we can ensure the positive positive effect of stock option incentive on capital structure adjustment.