Research On Patent Licensing In Mixed-Oligopoly Model

With the rapid development of science and technology,the increasingly fierce competition in high-technology and the improvement of the pro-tection of intellectual property rights,technology licensing has become the main way for many firms to obtain technological innovation.Through technology licensing,the patent holder to obtain profit,while patentor can also improve their technical level by accepting authorization.Previous studies on patent licensing mainly focus on private firm,few people concerned about the mixed ownership firms.With the promotion of mixed ownership reform,the market will include more mixed owner-ship firms.Different from public firms and private firms,the goal of mixed ownership firms is not only pursuing profit maximization,but also pursuing social welfare maximization.Under this background,we will establish a spatial heterogeneous product model--Hotelling model,and analysis two private firms or the mixed oligopoly which include one private ownership and one mixed-ownership firm are authorized by patent holders.In this paper,the author holds that if the patent holder is an outsider,the way to obtain the income is to maximize the authorized profit by licensing the technology.The key innovation of this paper lies in the introduction of mixed own-ership companies,and research on technology licensing problems under mixed oligopoly ownership between production companies which is not at the same time,influence on the authorization behavior and optimal li-censing mode.Through the analysis,we found in the fixed fee system,when the patent holder authorized to private firms,the optimal technology licensing model is the exclusive authorized;when the patent holder authorized for mixed oligopoly consisting of mixed ownership companies and private ownership of firms,the selection the optimal licensing mode depends on the initial the degree of privatization,technical level and technical inno-vation level.When the degree of privatization is relatively high,patent holders firms choose the exclusive license to the private ownership of firms,when privatization is relatively low,the authorized firms choose exclusive authorization to mixed ownership companies.Under the royalty system,regardless of the degree of innovation of the patent,and the form of the ownership of the producer,the patent holder will choose to au-thorize the two producers.In the two-part tariff system,no matter how the form of ownership of the manufacturer,the degree of privatization of the A of the manufacturer,the degree of innovation of the patent,patent holders tend to authorize.In the determination of the optimal licensing model,for the sake of their own profit maximization,the patent holder will choose the two charging mode to authorize.However,in the production of private firms,the two charges into a variable rate system.From this,we can draw the conclusion that the ownership structure will have an impact on the licensing behavior of the patent holder,but in the choice of the optimal licensing model,there have no different between two type ownership firms.