| In the final analysis,the competition among modern company is the talent competition.Executives as a company decision center,who is also an important human capital,play a key role in the growth of the company.How to motivate executives to work effectively is a problem worth discussing.Due to the separation of the two powers,the shareholders are not directly involved in the management of the company instead of entrusting the senior managers to manage,because of the different information and interests between them result in a series of agency problems.To reduce the agency cost,it is necessary to establish an effective incentive mechanism to combine the executives with shareholders.As a pillar of the national economy,the central enterprises play a significant role in the socialist market economy.At the same time,the central enterprises also undertake certain social responsibility,the particularity and importance of the political and economic status is self-evident.The managerial compensation of state-owned enterprises,especially the managerial compensation of large-scale central enterprises,has always been the focus of social concern.In recent years,the government released the documents Compensation Reform of the Central Management of Enterprises and Guidance on Deepening the Reform of State-owned Enterprises.In this context,it is urgent and necessary to study the managerial compensation incentive mechanism of listed central enterprises,which is important and significant to promote the reform and development of the central enterprises,as well as improve the company governance structure.In this paper,the main research methods are literature research,qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis,normative research and empirical research.Foremost,it reviews the domestic and foreign literature on managerial compensation and company performance,and defines the basic concept of the central enterprises,managerial compensation and company performance.What’s more,it introduces three theoretical bases: human capital theory,the principal-agent theory and incentive theory.Then the paper analyzes the present situation and problems of the listed central enterprises’ managerial compensation.It displays some problems: firstly,executives’ salaries are continuously increasing,but the internal gap is large.Secondly,the phenomenon of zero shareholding is common and executive shareholding ratio is low.Thirdly,there is obvious industry and region difference in managerial compensation.Fourth,the managerial compensation incentive mechanism and information disclosure system both have deficiencies.Moreover,there are governmental control and a lack of process evaluation in the reward and punishment system,and so forth.From the angle of theoretical analysis,the paper puts forward three research hypotheses.The paper chooses 281 listed central enterprises as the research object,and selects 1686 samples after removing the non-standard data from 2010 to 2015.In the paper,it takes the return on assets and earnings per share as explained variables,and regards managerial compensation,executive shareholding ratio,and perquisite consumption as explanatory variables,and views the company size,assets-liabilities ratio,equity concentration,regional dummy variables and industry dummy variables as control variables,and then establishes a multiple regression model,carrying out a descriptive statistical analysis,correlation analysis,multiple regression analysis and robustness test by means of SPSS software.The results are as followed: firstly,the managerial compensation is proportional to company performance.It shows that the managerial compensation incentive mechanism of the listed central enterprises has been function initially,stimulating the executives who can improve their earnings by improving the company performance.Secondly,the executive shareholding ratio and company performance is not related.The main reason could be that incentive mechanism on stock right has been impemented late in China,and the phenomenon of zero shareholding is common as well as executive shareholding ratio is low.It also reflects the managerial compensation structure is unreasonable,mainly monetary compensation as the short-term incentive,lacking of the effective long-term incentive mechanism and leading to the executive shareholding ratio being the less impact on the company performance.Thirdly: there is a significant negative correlation between executive perquisite consumption and company performance.There is excessive perquisite consumption in Chinese listed central enterprises,and the cost of perquisite consumption overweighs the benefits of growth,which has a negative impact on company performance.Therefore,perquisite consumption cannot be used as a feasible measure to motivate the executives,so it must be subject to proper regulation.Finally,according to the research results,and combined with incentive status and problems of Chinese listed central enterprises,this paper proposes some relevant policy suggestions,including the establishment of a diversified salary incentive mechanism and performance assessment system,the improvement to the transparency of perquisite consumption,the perfection of professional manager market and the supervision mechanism of managerial compensation. |
